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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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(Note: Numbers in this type of bracket { - } refer to notes at the end of the article.)
By Marco Angelini, Ph.D.
Scholars have to deal with multiple frames of interpretation in assessing the motivations and attitudes of those who collected information on the ancient thinkers, before they can offer any settled account of what an historical figure meant to say to his audience. Unsurprisingly, there is a very wide debate on how to interpret ancient fragments, as well as no settled consensus on the content of the material itself. Provocative aphorisms of the most notable fifth century Sophists, such as Protagoras' "Man is the Measure of all Things," and Gorgias' "Nothing Is," have been subject to seemingly endless cycles of interpretation. I do not propose to offer here a full analysis of the thought of the elder Sophists, but rather some suggestions as to how to avoid the obvious interpretive pitfalls, and a more specific discussion of how they have been construed by historians of thought. The problem of interpretation is highly relevant to Protagoras and Gorgias, since much of the evidence we possess for their thought is in the form of fragments. In addition, as Havelock and others have rightly pointed out, the Greek language went through important transitions during the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, and this adds to the possibilities of misinterpreting short texts which posses no real context. Despite the controversial aspects of Havelock's thesis on the transition between concrete language structures in pre-Socratic thought to abstract ones in Plato, it is widely accepted that some such movement in regard to the meaning of definitions did take place between the latter half of the fifth century and the first half of the fourth; specifically, there was a great deal of interest on the part of the Sophists, Socrates, and Plato in clarifying the relationship between language and reality and the way in which grammatical consistency and definitional clarity could aid human discourse. No interpretation or translation of early Greek thought can ignore the fluid and diachronic nature of Greek language in this period; as such, I would suggest that translations which insist on the reliance of literal interpretations of pre-Platonic sources are seriously questionable and, as a result, one should allow for significant latitude when looking at the evidence. Another problem in interpreting pre-Socratic thought, specific to the Sophists in this case, is that we rely for the greater part on Plato and Aristotle in contextualising their contributions to philosophy. Neither of the great thinkers were interested in representing Sophistic doctrines dispassionately (or fairly, as many have argued). McKirahan (1994) suggests that Plato was more interested in using them as dramatic and intellectual foils for his own arguments, which were in any case vastly different from theirs; also, that whilst Aristotle and his followers were engaged in producing historical surveys of the intellectual traditions that preceded Socrates, by then Aristotle had absorbed the Socratic/Platonic negative judgement of the Sophists and was thus disinclined to 'consider them serious philosophers'(p.355). It may be added that Plato's original literary treatment of Sophistic thought was probably coloured by his closeness in time to the actual debates and his personal commitment to Socrates; it may be the case that his more studied attitude to earlier pre-Socratic thinkers can be explained partly by the non-contemporaneousness of those debates. For these reasons, which are widely recognised amongst scholars today, it is crucial to explicate clearly the hermeneutical principles {1} along which the evidence should be read. The first of these is to favour readings based on the actual words of the Sophists (where there is a broad consensus that this is so {2}) as they link to, and are contextualised by, the culture and resonances of their time; more explicitly, this will entail de-emphasising the use of Plato and Aristotle as sources for the meaning of Sophistic thought. Whilst the full justification for this key position cannot be attempted here, it is nonetheless clear that if it can be argued that a substantial cultural and intellectual shift did take place over the course of the fifth century in Greece, and that the works of Plato and Aristotle are overwhelmingly concerned with elaborating their own philosophical positions, then there is a very strong case for arguing that the fourth-century interpretations of the Socratic philosophers are likely to be distorted and unreliable when it comes to understanding early Sophistic positions. Schiappa (1991) has proposed an interesting interpretive method in relation to the fragments of the Sophists that involves "triangulating" between pre-Sophistic and post-Sophistic literature, tracing the development of terms and their meanings as they are found in Homer through to Aristotle (pp.21-35). Intended to provide a diachronic context for key expressions, I would argue that there is, nonetheless, a serious problem with such a "meta-reading": we rely heavily on Aristotle and his school of thought for our understanding of the history of early Greek thought; indeed, the notion of a "history of philosophy" itself is closely bound to Aristotelian epistemological categories which, in turn, are bound to his ontological beliefs. If this is the case, then any analysis based on evidence found in Aristotelian "histories" will lead to conclusions that are burdened with the same ideological weight. To illustrate, it has been successfully argued already by others that Aristotle and his successors at the Lyceum were less than neutral or "historical" in their judgements on pre-Aristotelian thinkers {3}: in general, 'the complaint against Aristotle has been that his interest in advancing his own philosophical doctrines often led him to reformulate the ideas of his predecessors in order that they might be better explained, refuted, or assimilated by his own system' (Schiappa,1991:24). This process need not be understood as cynical misrepresentation, so much as an effort to understand past thought in terms of what was then considered best practice. Aristotle's epistemology in matters of the human sciences is clear on this: in Book Seven of the Nichomachean Ethics he explains that 'as in all our other discussions' the procedure in investigating a question is to: (1) collect all the relevant evidence, (2) point out the problems in the data, (3) collect together all the common opinions connected to the issue, and (4) resolve the contradictions between the received opinions, thereby being left with opinions which correspond to the available evidence. It is uncontroversial, however, to suggest that this seemingly straightforward scientific method leads Aristotle into complex epistemological terrain. According to Aristotelian principles that connect human knowledge to the way the world is distinguishable by discrete categories, his followers in the peripatetic school, Eudemus, Meno and Theophrastus, produced histories of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, theology and philosophy; invaluable as sources for modern scholars (though not everything remains of the complete texts, and we rely on later summaries of their work), it is important to note the influences of their master's philosophical programme on the organization and content of their analysis. In the case of Theophrastus, who wrote extensively on early philosophy up to Plato, we know from the only text of his of which we have a substantial part, that 'he was influenced by Aristotle's choice of topics, and judged the views he reports from an Aristotelian perspective' (McKirahan, 1994:4). His work On Sensation, for example, is not set out as a chronological exposition of past thinkers on that topic, but as a series of sub-groups of thinkers and opinions under headings that fit into Aristotelian parameters, such as theories of perception that hold that like can only apprehend like, or theories that declare that substance and change are mutually contradictory. There are explicit Aristotelian answers to these problems, and it is accepted most scholars that Theophrastus's efforts were influenced by the wish to present his school's views as a culmination of these philosophical problems. Most importantly, Aristotle's attitude to previous thinkers, and to rhetoric in particular (within which Aristotle groups the Sophists), can be traced to crucial ontological assumptions that are central to the way the history of ancient thought has been understood. According to Margolis (in Mailloux,1995) if we begin by looking at Aristotle's distinction between rhetoric and dialectic, we find a disjunction between his logical and metaphysical frameworks, one which undermines his analysis of pre-Socratic thought. He argues that Aristotle bases his idea of true science on dialectic, which proceeds from premises which are primary and true (or derived from premises which are primary and true); in the Topics, the argument continues, Aristotle warns against too close a link being drawn between science and rhetoric (or eristic) as this 'would only serve to trivialise truth in favour of opinion' (p.109): the reason for this, Aristotle continues, is that rhetorical discourse proceeds from premises which are only thought to be, but are not, primary and true. Clearly, this distinction is deeply problematic from the critical point of view of modern logic and metaphysics: which modern thinker would confidently separate scientific discourse from mere persuasion on such obviously contentious grounds? Yet it is only recently that the consequences of a serious questioning of Aristotelian epistemology have been developed. The character of scientific discourse as it compares to lesser forms is strongly hinted at by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics; the conclusion of this work is that happiness (eudaimonia) resides in contemplation of the universal elements in human affairs, that those who are able to raise themselves above the level of fluctuating opinion and separate their intellectual activity from the emotional attachments of everyday life are 'likely to be in the best state of mind and to be most loved by the Gods' (1179a21). Those who 'judge by outward appearances which are all that they can perceive' (1179a17) are held to be deficient in the frame of mind that allows for the deeper perceptions of knowledge. More specifically, this type of thinking can be traced back to the Socratic Realism that seeks general definitions over particular instances; in an example of who is qualified to give medical treatment, Aristotle declares that 'the best detailed treatment will be given by the doctor (or trainer or any other instructor) who has a general knowledge of what is good for all cases' (1180b13). Furthermore, this sort of knowledge that is perceptible to the intellect is characterised by the ability to generalise from many instances towards the universal: 'it would presumably be agreed that anyone who wants to be professionally qualified with theoretical knowledge must proceed to the study of the universal and get to know it as well as possible, for it is with this (as we have said) that the sciences deal' (1180b24). That rhetoric, as it is characterised by Aristotle, is inimical to this view of knowledge and the proper scope of science, is also shown in the Ethics, where the question asked is 'where can such knowledge be obtained?' (1181a2). In giving the Socratic answer that, though practical experience is also necessary to gain knowledge of politics, it is only those who possess 'a developed habit of mind' (1181b10) that can form critical judgements about various cases, Aristotle explicitly excludes the Sophists from this privileged way of thinking: since politics is a science, runs his argument, and science deals with critical understanding of universal phenomena, the Sophists must be ignorant of the essential aspects of political science since 'otherwise they would not equate it with, or rate it even lower than, rhetoric' (1181a15). The clear epistemological implication here is that the discourse of rhetoric is of a lower grade than that of science, and thus cannot aspire to engaging with knowledge as such. According to Margolis, the ontic/metaphysical assumptions that support this hierarchy are deeply problematic for modern philosophers and, importantly here, would not be shared by the most influential of the Sophists, Protagoras. If true, this would imply the existence of a non-Aristotelian Sophistic rhetoric that is grounded in wholly different ontological roots. The attempt, then, to read the earlier Sophistic fragments using the intellectual content of Aristotelian philosophy (Plato's attitude to rhetoric is even further entrenched in a hostile Socratic realism) would seem to be already an improbable route so far as recovering a broadly meaningful interpretation of Sophistic thought is concerned. Schiappa's triangulation between Homer and Aristotle through the Sophists presents important difficulties precisely because we rely so much on Plato and Aristotle and their metaphysical/ontic attachments for what we know of pre-Socratic and Sophistic thought; in fact, these become evident in Schiappa's own analysis where he predictably locates Protagoras's conceptualisation of justice as dike as an advance on Homeric "right" (themis) 'while not reaching the sophistication [sic] found in Plato and Aristotle'(Schiappa,1991:34). This Havelockian transition towards a substantial abstract concept is seen by Schiappa in the matrix of the oral/literate 'divide' {4}, and he argues persuasively that Protagorean thought is best interpreted in the light of orality. Yet the problem remains that, understood through the conceptual background of post-Socratic thought, interpretations of early Sophistic thought tend towards the conclusion that one is dealing with historically interesting but essentially sub-platonic philosophy; certainly, it can be well argued that a meaningful history of philosophy can be traced including notions that originate from Protagoras and Gorgias, but it should be noted that any such study will be based on methods and assumptions that post-date the culture and meanings which informed those thinkers {5}. Since for Protagoras and Gorgias any comparison between philosophy and rhetoric, whether ameliorative or pejorative, would be anachronistic (as it would be based on post-sophistic terminology), and since those are the terms within which historians of philosophy are compelled to operate, it follows that different criteria are needed if we are to tap Sophistic thought for meanings that are closer to their own frame of reference. If the first hermeneutical principle of a useful study of the two elder Sophists is to favour interpretations that rely on their actual words, what remains is the serious problem of accessing their meanings in such a way as to be truer to their intentions and context. By arguing that post-Socratic approaches fail to draw out the inner references and significance of early Sophistic thought due to their location in a culture that is alien to the modern mind, what is clearly required is a heuristic that will serve as a context for these meanings in order to provide access to modern scholars. In consequence, the second hermeneutical principle proposed is to make more extensive use of comparative and interdisciplinary research that can give resonance to the words of the Sophists in their own cultural and intellectual tradition. If we can speak of a Sophistic "rhetoric" that is anterior and "other" in relation to the Socratic tradition of enquiry, then its location in terms of archaic and classical culture becomes a crucial issue for scholars of ancient thought, as well as for those who try to forge links between ancient and modern thought. For historians of philosophy, the simplest and apparently most rewarding route towards interpreting pre-Socratic fragments has been through the more or less systematic approach of Plato, Aristotle and his followers; the tendency amongst scholars has been to delineate a clear progression towards a systematic rational discourse that could separate scientific knowledge from subjective opinion. Since the philosophical evidence to be found in the Socratic thinkers is so weighty and copious compared to the pitifully slight fragments we possess from the thinkers before Socrates, relatively little work has been conducted on the extra-philosophical foundations of the pre-Socratic thinkers. Given that the importance of pre-Socratic and Sophistic thought in general has been held to reside in its relation to Socratic philosophy, and given the difficulty of contextualising those fragments outside of the philosophical tradition, almost all studies of pre-Socratic thinkers have concentrated on drawing out whatever philosophical contributions that could be so interpreted without seeking to make serious connections with the culture and thought of the time {6}. And yet this approach would seem to run counter to an important aspect of early Greek culture: that there was far less separation between what we now consider to be distinct academic disciplines and cultural forms. On the basis of Socrates' distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is only with Plato that there emerges an educational programme based on distinct disciplines and a separation between arts and sciences such as we would recognise today. The scholarly practice of abstracting philosophical discourses, as recognised by modern thinkers, from a cultural context where no such autonomy prevails is especially suspect in the case of archaic and early classical Greece. To take an example from that variegated category of thinkers that is "Presocratic Philosophy," Empedocles of Acragas is an admittedly extreme representation of the multifacetedness that is being described. An eclectic figure who has proved elusive to later doxographers and historians, we have evidence that he practised medicine, magic and politics as well as being a poet, tragedian, seer, historian and scientist {7}. Although there is good reason to suppose that his varied interests were interrelated in a more or less self-consistent attitude to the world, the predominant view on Empedocles (as on the other pre-Socratics) has been to underline his contribution to the advancement of scientific thought, and in particular to the idea that knowledge must possess philosophical foundations in order to be of any importance {8}. Since Empedocles is thought to have made such a contribution through his interest in natural phenomena (how they occur, are composed, and relate to humans), his role has acquired an importance which is wholly related to the history of science and philosophy; very little has been written concerning what his thought can tell us about early fifth-century culture. The reason for this, as alluded to above, is that not enough attention has been paid to alternative ways of contextualising pre-classical thought that avoid philosophical discourses. In the case of Empedocles, though it is possible (and perfectly legitimate) to read his fragments in terms of the transition from mythic/theological explanations towards proto/scientific paradigms that favour explaining the cosmos as an intelligible set of natural relationships, it is my contention that a rich seam of meanings is available for a heuristic that is serious about developing a picture of that culture as it understood itself; in avoiding anachronistic assumptions contained in traditions that post-date the first half of the fifth century, such an effort must concentrate on forms and narratives that we can be fairly certain were meaningful to the thinkers in question. |
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