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The
Philosophy of the Existentialists
French
Existentialists
Gabriel
Marcel
Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), a dramatist and
philosopher, a convert from Hegelianism to Roman
Catholicism, is the most representative of the
French Existentialists. He expressed his thought in
the Metaphysical Journal; Being and
Having; and From Refusal to
Invocation. None of these works, however,
are systematic treatises.
The work of putting the writings of Marcel into
a logical whole was achieved by one of his friends.
Marcel introduced this compilation to the public
with the words: "This is the book I should have
written!"
The philosophical thought of Marcel had
originally been expressed in the form of scattered
statements, of deep flashes of insight into the
problems of human life, which he had noted in his
Metaphysical Journal as early as 1925, even before
the publication of the works of Heidegger.
According to Marcel, philosophy is not
research on being but an attempt to find
being. By this distinction he means that the
object of philosophy is not a thing separate from
us, one about which we ask questions for the
purpose of reaching some solution. The object of
philosophical research is the inquiring subject
himself, not only because he is a being but because
he is the first being who is brought into his own
immediate experience. Hence philosophy necessarily
must be existentialist, and its starting point must
be this immediate fact: actual existence in the
world.
This distinction between research on being and
an attempt to find being is followed by another
subtle distinction between "problem" and "mystery."
Marcel designates as problems all the
questions which are concerned with the objects
conceived of as distinct from us. Concerning these,
we may ask questions, and we may deduce a
"solution." On the contrary, he calls "mysteries"
all those questions which are concerned with our
own existence. The answer to such questions can be
obtained only through mystical "recollection."
Besides these two distinctions, Marcel makes
another between having and being. He observes that
having implies a dualism composed of a possessing
subject and a possessed object; having is
concerned with objective exteriority. Being
on the contrary, does not admit of any dualism, for
the object is identical with the subject. Thus I do
not have my body; I am my body.
Having made these distinctions, Marcel begins
his philosophical research with the existent, and
starts from the level of knowledge. First of all,
he observes that perception is not a simple
representation of an object to the sentient
subject. Sensation essentially consists in the act
of perceiving, and this act is "mine." To perceive
an object means that the subject becomes
mysteriously that object. Thus by means of
perception I am deepening in a new and mysterious
way my participation in the universe. Perception is
like a creation of the universe in me.
The first and most intimate participation is
that effected with my body. In virtue of the
distinction between "problem" and "mystery," the
union of the soul with the body is not open to
investigation; for Marcel such a union is a
mystery. I am my body, which means that I am
"incarnated" in my body, not in the sense that I
could not be existent without this mysterious
"other" which is my body.
Through my body I perceive surrounding objects.
They represent a transcendent thing for me; but
through the act of perception I am open to them and
they are open to me. Thus the act of perception is
an act of love. Through it I transcend myself; I am
in mysterious participation with objects. Through
the act of perception objects become immanent in
me. Now, the objects are no longer a third
thing; they become the "thou" with whom I
talk.
From the "thou" of the finite things I ascend to
God, the absolute Thou. Thus, I feel God as present
to me and I invoke Him. The existence of God is an
object of faith and not of reason; and faith is
possible only when charity overcomes all
impediments and all obstacles. Man thus becomes
available to all, and all become available to
man.
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René
Le Senne: Dialectic of Contradiction
Le Senne's Existentialism is the inverse of the
Idealism of Homelin, his teacher. Homelin taught
that philosophy is a dialectic of categories acting
according to the rhythm of "con-relation." That is,
every category is limited and insufficient, and
hence must be in relation to another which is
higher and richer, and this with another, until we
reach the absolute Consciousness, which is the
perfect personality.
Le Senne (1882-1954) inverts this dialectic in
the sense that the last category of Homelin is for
him the first. According to Le Senne, philosophy
must take its initial rise from the existent, for
no category can have real value unless it is in
relation to a personal consciousness.
At the start of his philosophical research Le
Senne observes that "the existent" for all is
"freedom"; this is a fact of immediate experience
and of psychological observation. Moreover, he
observes that freedom supposes a "rupture" in the
being, and in relation to this rupture man must
accept his existence in the world as implying a
"duty" to reestablish in his consciousness being it
its unity.
In doing so, the existent will become a true
person. By the rupture of being, Le Senne means any
"contradiction" which is in our own existence,
e.g., doubt in the intellectual life, suffering in
the sensitive life. In performing the duty of
overcoming such obstacles, the existent may be
discouraged; this is the case of the existent who
will be enfolded by the world of nature and become
a "thing among things." Thus he will become really
"sub-ject," i.e., "thrown under" or subjected by
obstacles.
But if the existent take the "contradictions" as
a means of enriching his own existence, then the
obstacles will be considered as a "value," and by
overcoming them he will be on the way to achieving
his personal end. Hence it depends upon us as to
whether we become a thing or a person. And since
the obstacles and contradictions will rise over and
over again, there must be in the existent a
never-exhausted courage and energy for constructing
his personality.
This ascent from value to value will find its
final term in God, at which point we can say: "God
is with us." Since God is the Value of values, He
gives value to the life of the existent; since He
is the Person, He wills that the existent become a
person by means of his reason and his freedom. In
short, God puts the existent in the rupture of
being, i.e., in the state of contradiction and
warfare, with the intention that existent should
recompose all things in peace.
Louis
Lavelle: Doctrine of Participation
For Le Senne God is the Value and hence
transcends all ruptures and contradictions. For
Lavelle (1883-1951) although God is transcendent,
He is the most intimate of all determinations of
being; all is filled with Him. The sense of being
filled with God is what Lavelle calls "the mystery
of our existence."
Having arrived at this stage, Lavelle observes
that we must seek a point of contact with God; and
when we discover this point, we must be prepared to
sacrifice joyously all other particular things, in
order to illuminate this contact with the Divinity.
Thus the existent finds the meaning of its
existence.
In order to explain what he means by communion
with God, Lavelle appeals to the doctrine of
"participation." According to him, God is the
absolute Act, while the creature is a "participant"
of the divine act; God is the "Act"; we are "from
the Act."
To clarify his teaching that we are distinct
from God, Lavelle introduces the theory of the
interval. By "interval" he means the distinction
between essence and existence. Thus the exemplar of
our essence is in God; but our existence, which if
"from" God, is not in God.
The existence of a contingent being means
poverty and deficiency in relation to its own
essence, and hence it must make every effort to
have its existence coincide with its essence. To
what what we are means to know what we must do to
make our existence worthy of its essence.
Jean-Paul
Sartre: Theological and Moral
Nihilism
While for the philosopher Heidegger the existent
is reduced to a being tending to death, for
Sartre (1905-1980) (picture),
the existent is identified with the series of
phenomena which tell us of its existence. In
other words, to be an existent means to be a
series of appearances. Ordinarily, appearance tells
us of a dualism, i.e., the appearance and what is
hidden in that appearance. Such a dualism is denied
by Sartre and he maintains instead that
appearance is the entire and only
reality.
As a result God, who cannot be phenomenal, does
not exist; and the existent is only one unit
in the complete series of phenomena, and is
"without support and help." The drama of such a
negative condition is manifested in moments
of "nausea and disgust," similar to the anguish of
Kierkegaard except that the discomfort of the
Danish philosopher resulted in a quest for God,
while in Sartre it is the demonstration of the
"nothingness" with which the existent is
infected.
However, the existent is actuated by "the
other," in the sense that he finds in himself the
representation of the world. Thus the existent is
founded on an opposition: he is both the subject of
consciousness and the representation of the world.
Sartre calls the terms of this opposition the
"pour-soi" or "for-self" (the existent as subject
of consciousness) and the "en-soi" or "in-self"
(the world, i.e., the totality of phenomena). Each
of these two terms is established because of its
negative relation to the other; that is, the
"for-self" is not the "in-self" and vice versa.
The opposition between the for-self and the
in-self is insuperable. Indeed, if the for-self
were synthesized or metamorphosed into the in-self,
it would become God; but we know that this idea is
contradictory. Thus the existent is nothing other
than a "useless passion," a "project" with the
assignment of putting itself into execution.
Since, according to Sartre, God does not exist
and man is without "support and help," the existent
must construct his existence freely: "Man is
damned to be free." In regard to the free execution
of the project of existence, Sartre repeats the
maxim of Ivan Karamazov of Dostoevski's famed
novel: "If God does not exist, all is permitted";
hence freedom results in arbitrary acts in the
carrying out of the project of existence.
The atheism and amoralism of Sartre may be
considered as the ultimate corruption of
Existentialism, and of philosophy in general.
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