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The Great Thinkers of Western Philosophy |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
John Locke had determined the fundamental principle of Empiricism: the immediate object of knowledge is sensations which the subject experiences within himself. From this doctrine arose the problem of determining whether outside these subjective representations there was a reality corresponding to them, and whether this reality was knowable. Locke, with some hesitation making use of the principle of causality, had concluded affirmatively, by admitting the existence of substance as a support of such sensations, and the existence of God. George Berkeley, another leading empiricist, had attacked the distinction between material and spiritual substance, and had denied the existence of the first, which he reduced to a mode of sensation. He had, however, affirmed the existence of spiritual substances, God and spirits. Hume accepted dogmatically what had been the initial step for Locke and Berkeley -- namely, that the object of knowledge is solely the sense impressions perceived by the subject. But he did not allow himself to make any concession to classical philosophy, as Locke had done by admitting the validity of the principle of causality and the existence of substance. Nor was he guided by any dogmatic or religious principles, such as those which had led Berkeley to admit the existence of spiritual substance. Instead, Hume logically developed to its extreme conclusions the empiristic principle that subjective impressions alone are the immediate objects of knowledge. Passage outside our sensitive impressions is not possible. Hence there is no metaphysics: we know nothing of God, of the exterior world, or of our own soul. David Hume (picture) was born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1711. He studied at the University in his native city, revealing a passionate interest in philosophy and literature. During a sojourn in France, he wrote his Treatise on Human Nature, in three volumes, which were published in 1739 and 1740. When this work did not meet with the success its author expected, Hume rewrote it in a more popular form, which he published successively under the titles Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. As a staff member of the British embassy, he had occasion to travel in Holland, Austria, Italy, and again in France. Here he struck up a friendship with Rousseau, whom he brought to England; but there this friendship was broken. Hume also dedicated himself to the study of history, and wrote an important History of Great Britain. He died in 1776. Besides the works already mentioned, other important ones by Hume are: Natural History of Religion, and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume is a representative British type: litterateur, philosopher, politician, man of affairs and of the world. III. Hume's Theory of Knowledge According to Hume, the prime, constitutive and fundamental elements of knowledge are impressions and ideas. The difference between impressions and ideas lies in the degree of vividness with which the sensory fact is presented. Thus the impression is an actual vivid perception which, as Hume says, brings with it conviction or positive belief in the existence of a corresponding objective reality. The idea is an element derived from the impression, and hence is less vivid than the latter; it is a copy which the impression leaves behind. It is one thing to open my eyes and see the red tapestry in the room where I am sitting, the table on which I am writing, and the objects which are on that table. It is another thing to close my eyes and have the image of what I have seen in my room. The first is impression, because it is vivid; the second is a weak representation of the first and is an idea. Impressions and ideas are not psychic atoms isolated from one another. They are all linked together by an inclination to recall one another. This permits thought to pass from an actual impression to the idea of other impressions obtained in the past, and from these ideas to other ideas. This is the law of association of ideas, a fundamental point in Hume's doctrine and the basis for complex ideas. Thus ideas are naturally associated with one another and form large groups, and these groups in turn are related, to form still larger groups. The belief that behind these groups of representations there is a reality corresponding to them gives origin to belief in an external world, regulated by the same laws that exist in the world of thought. Hume distinguishes three type types of association: likeness, contiguity in time and space, cause and effect. Another fundamental law of Hume's theory of knowledge is that of habit. Impressions succeed one another with a certain constancy. For example, every time I have drawn near the stove, I have felt warm. This realization, experienced in the past, of having observed one phenomenon constantly united with another, gives rise to the habit of my expecting also in the future a repetition of what has happened in the past, so that, having placed the first condition, I have a trusting expectancy of the second: every time I approach the stove, from force of habit I expect to warm myself. Force of habit gives to the constancy of the phenomenon experienced in the past the force of metaphysical necessity, and from it results the concept of substance, of the laws which govern such substances; in short, the resulting term is philosophy and science. But are philosophy and science reasonably justifiable? Hume answers in the negative. How much absolute certainty are we able to attain? Hume admits only two instances:
Outside these two types, there is no certitude, philosophical or scientific, strong enough to excluded all doubt. |
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