The
Philosophy of Aristotle
VI.
Cosmology
Cosmology as a science of nature (it was called
physics by Aristotle) is connected with chemistry,
physics and astronomy, sciences which were in a
rudimentary state during the time of Aristotle. As
a consequence Aristotle's cosmology is the weakest
part of his philosophical system. We shall limit
ourselves to giving a brief summary of this branch
of his teaching.
Aristotelian cosmology is based on the principle
of the mover and the thing moved. It is dualistic:
God, Pure Act, immovable Mover, who transcends
cosmic reality; and cosmic reality, consisting of
the heavens which rotate around the earth.
Every sphere of the heavens is formed of
incorruptible matter. God moves the highest sphere.
The form of the sphere is round, and the spheres'
movement is circular (the sphere is considered as
the most perfect body).
The earth, which is at the center of the
universe (geocentric system), receives its movement
from the heavenly spheres, but it has
characteristics opposed to them. It is formed of
the four essences of Empedocles, and its motion is
from higher to lower or vice versa. Movement, which
comes from the heavenly bodies, is the proximate
cause of all the becoming in the world.
In the cosmology of Aristotle there are some
theoretical points that are worthy of
consideration. Precisely because these points are
theoretical they do not have essential dependence
upon his physics.
Change is the passage from potency to act and is
of four kinds:
- Substantial (change of the substantial form,
birth and death);
- Qualitative (change of some quality);
- Quantitative (increase or diminution);
and
- Spacial (change of place and of any of the
other species of motion).
Space is defined as the immovable limit of the
surrounding body with respect to the body
surrounded.
Time is the measure of movement, the aspect of
"before" and "after."
The so-called teleology (finality) of nature
merits special consideration: nature does, as far
as is possible, always that which is more
beautiful. The end of nature is the realization of
the form in matter, the development of potency into
act; but this tendency will never be completely
realized because, with the exception of Pure Act
(God), the act must exist in potency.
VII.
Psychology
Life is called soul by Aristotle, and is
the form of organized matter, and the principle
of immanent action. Consequently, living beings
are distinguished from minerals, whose form is the
principle of transient action.
Corresponding to the three hierarchical grades
of living beings there are three forms of psychic
life:
- Vegetative life, proper to plants,
whose operations are for the nourishment and
growth of the plants themselves;
- Sensitive life, proper to animals,
which, besides nutrition and growth, have also
the faculty of locomotion and of sense; and
- Intellective life, proper to man,
who, besides assuming the two inferior souls
(vegetative and sensitive), has also the faculty
of knowing through universal concepts.
Contrary to Plato, who affirmed that there are
in man two distinct souls (one having two aspects)
and that the union of the rational soul with the
body is accidental, Aristotle vindicates the
oneness of the soul, which is the form (entelechy)
of the body and hence is immanent in it.
The various functions proper to the vegetative
and sensitive life are performed by the one soul,
which also has the capability of performing
superior operations, of gaining knowledge through
concepts (intellectual cognition).
Cognitive Activities
There are two cognitive activities of the soul,
and these give origin to two distinct types of
knowledge: sensible and intellective.
Sensible cognition, sensation, is objective and
presupposes a physical fact, a contact of the
object with an organ or sense of the subject, who
then transforms the physical contact into a psychic
act, or cognition of the object.
There are five senses, each of which perceives
its proper sensible; the eye, for example,
apprehends light; the taste, sapidity.
Aristotle calls common sensibles those
qualities of the object that can be perceived by
more than one sense organ -- size and shape, for
instance, which can be perceived by the senses of
sight and touch.
To the sensitive faculties belong also the
memory (the faculty which preserves images already
perceived) and the phantasy or imagination (the
faculty which revives such images and represents
them in the absence of the object itself).
The proper object of
sensitive knowledge is the individual, the
particular, the contingent and material
thing.
The intellect, on the
other hand, has as its object the universal, the
necessary, the immutable, the essences, the forms
of things abstracted from their
individuation.
But for Aristotle the intellect does not
possess innate ideas. Contrary to the innatism
of Plato, Aristotle defends the theory of the
tabula rasa (blank slate).
In its first awakening the intellect possesses
no beautiful and formed ideas; it has only the
capacity for receiving ideas, and acquires them by
abstraction from the data of the senses. Sensation
contains the universal concept "in potentia"; the
intellect has the power of enucleating the
universal.
We are now confronted with two potencies which
of themselves cannot be the cause of the passage
into act. Aristotle solves the difficulty by having
recourse to an intellect which he calls
poieticos, the agent intellect, in which the
intelligible species is in act. This acts upon the
so-called passive intellect (pateticos) and gives
actuality to the concept contained in potency in
the sensation.
Analogous to cognitive activity, there are also
two practical activities of the soul: the appetite
and the will. The appetite is a tendency toward a
good presented by way of sensitive cognition and is
proper to the animal soul. The will is the impulse
toward a good guided by reason, and is proper to
the rational soul.
The Immortality of the Soul
The question of the immortality of the human
soul is one of the most obscure in the doctrine of
Aristotle. It appears in fact that he affirms the
immortality of the active intellect, which is one
for all human beings; and denies it for the passive
intellect, which is individual and the immanent
form of the body.
On the other hand, Aristotle admits that the
proper object of the soul is the knowledge of the
universal, of the immaterial, of essences, and
hence it is impossible to understand how the
individual soul can perish with the body.
The steps in Aristotle's reasoning on this point
are not clear, and thus his interpreters have
divided them into opposing opinions.
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