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Aristotle's Spurned Legacy, by George J. Irbe (con't)

 

Aristotle's views on God and the soul

Through the ages, most Western scholars have viewed Aristotle's concept of God and the soul rather disparagingly. For Aristotle, they say, God is the distant and uninvolved Prime Mover and the soul is simply a property of something that is alive, and therefore it is as mundane and of no more consequence than a biological property of the living being. Aristotle's concept has nothing in common with the immortal soul of man as envisioned by the three monotheistic religions which share the same roots in the Bible. It has been convenient for Western scholars, even those of agnostic or atheistic bent, to keep Aristotle's concept of God and soul out of the picture, so to speak, because of course -- and this whether one believes in the biblical God and soul, or does not -- the biblical model is the one and only genuine transcendental model of God and the human soul that one is supposed to recognize as such. Any other philosophy about God and the disposition of the human soul is paganistic and therefore unworthy of serious consideration. This narrow-mindedness, this tunnel vision, has prevailed through the centuries to our day, much to the detriment of Western thought.

The consensus view of Aristotle's understanding of God is stated very well by Frederick Copleston in A History of Philosophy, Vol. I :

The First Mover, being immaterial, cannot perform any bodily action: His action must be purely spiritual, and so intellectual. In other words, God's activity is one of thought. But what is the object of His thought? Knowledge is intellectual participation of the object: now, God's object must be the best of all possible objects, and in any case the knowledge enjoyed by God cannot be knowledge that involves change or sensation or novelty. God therefor knows himself in an eternal act of intuition or self-consciousness. Aristotle, then, defines God as "Thought of Thought." God is subsistent thought, which eternally thinks itself. (p. 316)
 
Aristotle may not have spoken of the First Mover as being personal, and certainly the ascription of anthropomorphic personality would be very far indeed from his thoughts, but since the First Mover is Intelligence or Thought, it follows that He is personal in the philosophic sense. The Aristotelian God may not be personal secundum nomen, but He is personal secundum rem. . . . there is no indication that Aristotle ever thought of the First Mover as an object of worship, still less as a Being to Whom prayers might profitably be addressed. And indeed, if Aristotle's God is entirely self-centered, as I [Copleston] believe Him to have been, then it would be out of the question for men to attempt personal intercourse with Him. In the Magna Morlia Aristotle says expressly that those are wrong who think that there can be a friendship towards God. For (a) God could not return our love, and (b) we could not in any case be said to love God. (p. 317)
 
. . . Aristotle leaves out of account that Divine operation in the world . . . which is an essential element in any satisfactory rational theology. The Aristotelian God is efficient Cause only by being the final Cause. He does not know this world and no Divine plan is fulfilled in this world: the teleology of nature can be nothing more than unconscious teleology (at least this is the only conclusion that will really fit in with the picture of God given in the Metaphysics). (p. 319)

Aristotle's conjectures about the character of God are described accurately enough in the above quotes from Copleston. However, Copleston shows that he is as hung up as any other Western scholar always has been on the dogmatic belief that a "satisfactory rational theology" must be based on Divine intervention in the world of man. By "rational theology" he means, of course, the three bible-based religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. If there is no myth associated with it, if there are no religious rituals and objects, if God is not worshiped in a synagogue, church, or mosque, it is not "satisfactory rational theology."

As for the soul, Copleston's remarks on De Anima in Chapter XXX of the History are also true to Aristotle's views. For Aristotle the soul is "the vital principle of living things"; it is "the cause and principle of the living body, (a) as a source of movement, (b) as a final cause, and (c) as the real substance (i.e. formal cause) of animated bodies." There are different types of soul, the lowest being the nutritive or vegetative soul, the highest the human soul. The human soul has all the attributes of the lower souls and in addition it has the power of intellect. Aristotle thought that of the several parts of the soul, all others die when the body dies, but "the active intellect is immortal."

The immortal "active" intellect part of the soul has been translated into English as "mind"; the pertinent passage from De Anima reads:

Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more; this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, remember its former activity because, while the mind in this sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it nothing thinks. (DA/JAS, 430a22-25)

When I read the above passage for the first time, I immediately thought of the philosophical consistency in Aristotle's conjectures about both God and the human soul (the part which he called the "active intellect"). The consistency is demonstrated by the following passage from the Metaphysics:

Is it not the case that what has no matter is indivisible, like human intellect, or even that which is thinking of a composite object in an interval of time? For it does not possess goodness in this part or in that part but possesses the highest good in the whole, though it is distinct from it. It is in this manner that Thinking is the thinking of Himself through all eternity. (M/HGA, 1075a07-10)

It was a pleasant surprise to me to realize how compatible is Aristotle's concept of God and soul as immaterial entities with my own belief in the immaterial Creator God - "a being that which no greater can be thought of" after Anselm, and my belief in the immaterial soul, after Popper and Eccles, in The Self and Its Brain. Aristotle and I are separated by a gap of 2400 years in knowledge and understanding of the Creator's universe. Consider what Aristotle had to work with as the prevailing hypothesis of the universe, described by Copleston in A History of Philosophy:

Aristotle maintained the view that the earth, spherical in shape [at least it was not flat!, G.I.], is at rest in the centre of the universe, and that around it lie the layers, concentric and spherical, of water, air and fire or the warm. Beyond these lie the heavenly spheres, the outermost of which, that of the fixed stars, owes its motion to the First Mover. Assuming from Calippus the number thirty-three as the number of spheres which must be presupposed in order to explain the actual motion of the planets, Aristotle assumed also twenty-two backward-moving spheres, interposed between the other spheres, in order to counteract the tendency of a sphere to disturb the motion of the planet in the next encompassed sphere.(p. 326)

I cogitate on how Aristotle would re-define his First Mover, if, instead of struggling with the heavenly spheres, he had our knowledge and understanding (incomplete, but surely better than what was known and understood 2400 years ago) of the composition of matter down to its smallest particles and of the indistinguishability of matter from energy at these levels; and if his conjectures were based on our current hypotheses about the creation and the structure of the universe and on our observations of the on-going dynamic processes within it. I am convinced that Aristotle would propose a First Mover very similar to the Creator-God I believe in.

I share Aristotle's belief that the soul is the vital principle of living things, and the only difference in our respective beliefs is that I consider the human soul (and all other souls of living things) to be indivisible unities whereas Aristotle divides the soul into parts. I believe that the immaterial soul can survive the physical death of the body, but Aristotle believes that only the active intellect, or the "mind" part of the soul survives -- one might say that the Aristotelian "active intellect" unites, appropriately enough, with the "Thought of Thought." Aristotle is also known for his scientific investigations, particularly in biology. I'm sure that today Aristotle would have no difficulty in modifying his ideas on the several parts of the soul to fit our modern knowledge in molecular biology. For example, Hugh Lawson-Tancred notes in his translation of De Anima (p. 164) that many scientists agree that the "formal cause" function of Aristotle's soul presages the role of DNA in modern biology.

A proper and fair assessment of a person's philosophy -- particularly concerning transcendental matters -- should be based, first of all, on the person's major philosophical premises. The details surrounding these premises are of secondary importance; they are bound to reflect the conventional knowledge and understanding of the time. I understand Aristotle's major premises to be: (a) God is the Supreme Being, encompassing all that is good, (b) living things have a soul, and (c) there is a natural common-sense code of ethics and morals which men should live by in order to approach the state of goodness of the Divine.

I am certain that Aristotle was a good man, fair and law-abiding. He had to be to be the author of the Nicomachean Ethics. There is one passage in the Ethics that I find particularly expressive of Aristotle's major premises. The following is from a mix of translations by W. D. Ross, J.A.K. Thomson and T. Irwin:

Now we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be the soul's activity and actions that express reason, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these. Each function is completed well when its completion expresses the proper virtue. Therefore, the human good turns out to be the soul's activity that expresses virtue. And if there are more virtues than one, the good will express the best and most complete virtue. (N, 1098a13-18)

Aristotle repeated the same advice in Politics, when he was making the point that in order to have a good political community, there must first of all be good citizens:

Accordingly, since the soul is indeed more honorable then the body or external possessions, both without qualification and to us, the best position of the soul, too, is of necessity analogously related to the best position of the body or of those possessions. Further, external goods and those of the body are chosen by nature for the sake of the soul and should be so chosen by all men of good judgment, but the soul is not chosen for the sake of these goods. Now let us acknowledge that the extent to which we become happy corresponds to the extent to which our virtues and prudence and the actions according to these are present, and let us acknowledge as a witness also God, who is happy and blessed not because of any external goods but because of Himself and His kind of nature. (P/HGA, 1323b16-25)

Aristotle states that God is eternal and encompasses all that is good; good that we only attain on occasion and never as perfectly as God does:

If, then, the manner of God's existence is as good as ours sometimes is, but eternally, then this is marvelous, and if it is better, this is still more marvelous; and it is the latter. And life belongs to God, for the actuality of the intellect is life, and He is actuality; and His actuality is in virtue of itself as life which is the best and is eternal. We say that God is a living being which is eternal and the best; so life and continuous duration and eternity belong to God, for this is God (M/HGA, 1072b25 -- 1072b30).

However, even though men are but animals, Aristotle exhorts them to never cease, through the power of their reason, to live a good and virtuous life and to bring forth that Divine goodness which is in them in order to achieve immortality of their soul:

If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, of mortal things, but must so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best things in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything. (N/WDR, 1177b29-1178a02)

It seems to me that Aristotle's ideas about God were in a state of flux. That does not surprise me, in view of the unreal and even childish hypotheses of the universe which prevailed in his time. In Book XII of the Metaphysics Aristotle struggles with the cumbersome "heavenly spheres" and their "Prime Mover." In the above passage from the Nicomachean Ethics, where he deals with human emotions and values, he is thinking of God as the embodiment of ideal goodness which men must strive to emulate. Which leads me to wonder what heights of development this Aristotelian concept of God could have reached in the subsequent 2400 years up to our day, had it not been smothered and superseded by the dogma of the biblical God.

Aristotle's spurned legacy

If Aristotle's thoughts, as expressed in his lectures and writings, are evaluated while keeping in mind the political and social circumstances in which he had to try to make a good life for himself while upholding his standards of virtue, then one can conclude that Aristotle made a marvelous job of it. He understood the nature of man and knew that man was capable of being the worst of all animals, as has already been noted. Aristotle also knew how difficult it is to habituate men to live a good, virtuous life, but he never stopped trying to convince them to do so. Toward the end of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the problem and even recommends the use of the law, if necessary, to compel parents and teachers to provide the right up-bringing to children:

Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature's part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some divine cause is present in those who are truly fortunate; while argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed. For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways? And in general passion seems to yield not to argument but to force. The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is base. But it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason their nurture and occupations should be fixed by law. (N/WDR, 1179b20-35)

The Nicomachean Ethics is a truly awesome achievement by one man. It is the only practical and purely secular (and therefore the only worthwhile one, in my opinion) framework for a moral and ethical code of conduct. No one can testify to this with more authority than Mortimer J. Adler, who is a life-long student of Aristotle and who has used the Aristotelian framework to create just such a code for our own modern times. In Adler's words, from The Time of Our Lives:

. . . the Nicomachean Ethics is a unique book in the Western tradition of moral philosophy. As Aristotle is uniquely the philosopher of common sense, so his moral philosophy is uniquely the ethics of common sense. It is the only ethics that is both teleological and deontological, the only ethics that is sound, practical, and undogmatic, offering what little normative wisdom there is for all men to be guided by, but refraining from laying down rules of conduct to cover the multifarious and contingent circumstances of human action. In the history of Western moral thought, it is the only book centrally concerned and concerned throughout with the goodness of a whole human life, with the parts of this whole, and with putting the parts together in the right order and proportion. As far as I know, its only parallel is to be found outside of Western culture in the moral teachings of Confucius, which address themselves to the same problem and which offer a solution to it that also refines the wisdom of common sense. (p. 236)

Let me now repeat what I understand Aristotle's major premises to be: (a) God is the Supreme Being, encompassing all that is good, (b) living things have a soul, and (c) there is a natural common-sense code of ethics and morals which men should live by in order to approach the state of goodness of the Divine. I will be bold enough to claim that even if Aristotle expressed these premises somewhat differently, in line with the knowledge of his time, today he would re-state them in words very similar to mine.

I have stated the three main premises in their conventional hierarchy of precedence. But, curiously enough (and I feel that Aristotle would agree with me), the third one which posits a natural moral and ethical code for men is the most important of the three. Because, if men cannot first of all decide on what they must do to make themselves human, contemplation about whether God and soul exist or not becomes as unnecessary for man as it is for other animals.

The above sets the stage for my argument about Aristotle's legacy to mankind which mankind has chosen to spurn. Let's first recall Copleston's remarks about the lack of Divine operation in the world in Aristotle's philosophy about God, and that this lack excludes Aristotle's view of God from the classification of "satisfactory rational theology." In my opinion, the dubious "satisfaction" and the fraudulent "rationality" of the theology that Copleston is talking about, i.e. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, are based on the fact that morals and ethics are dictatorial edicts laid down by God; they are to be practiced by men not -- as Aristotle claims -- because men's common sense and reason tells them that it is good to do so, but because God commands them to do so. This God was conceptualized by an obscure tribe of the middle East. In order to flatter their own ego and please their own (very natural and human) selfish wants, they further conceived of this God as their Father, and themselves exclusively as His children. This God was paternal, tribal, and also personal; He protected the individual and the tribe from danger, and provided for their material needs. With this paternalistic God to back one up, one could compete fiercely with other tribes and other gods in the game of "my god is better than your god."

This God, being like a father to you, also loves you personally, and because He loves you, He will forgive you for breaking His moral commandments, if you worship Him, plead with Him, pray to Him, ask for His forgiveness, etc. It is on this very point that Aristotle's moral code is unpalatable to the believers in the biblical God.

Aristotle says that there is something of the Divine in men and asks men to use their common sense and their natural ability to tell good from bad and right from wrong, so that they may live a good life and strive to be as good as God is. The onus is entirely on man. If man acts contrary to the code, he acts contrary to the natural code for man's behavior. There is no one to forgive him for breaking it; therefore, he cannot act contrary to the code again and again and, having in each case shown the proper contrition, still feel that he is a good man living a good life. But that is precisely how man can misuse, usually to some selfish advantage, the moral code prescribed by the very personal and paternalistic biblical God; he can still feel that he is a good man even after any number of evil deeds, because he has asked for God's forgiveness after committing the evil deeds.

The biblical religions offer what Aristotle cannot: a personal and paternal God who loves one and forgives one's immoral and evil acts, and, in the later development of these religions, promises one immortality in heaven or paradise. The biblical religions are religions of convenience, whereas Aristotle offers no convenient ways to evade moral responsibility, nor a convenient route to immortality. Therefore, it is not surprising that Western man chose the biblical God as his model and turned away from the philosophical model of the natural God (a non-dogmatic concept open to further development, understanding, and perfection) which was taking shape in the Greek civilization.

Thus was Aristotle's legacy of a code of morals and ethics and his incipient hypotheses about God and the soul spurned by Western civilization. It was a great mistake to do so. One need only tune in to the latest news from the middle East to realize how great was the mistake.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works by Aristotle:

Nicomachean Ethics: Translated by H. Rackham [Loeb Classical Library] N/HR; Translated by W.D. Ross [Great Books of the Western World #9 -- Aristotle: II, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952] N/WDR.

Politics: Translated by Benjamin Jowett [Great Books of the Western World #9 -- Aristotle: II, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952] P/BJ; Translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle [Peripatetic Press, 1986] P/HGA.

De Anima: Translated by J.A. Smith [Great Books of the Western World #8 -- Aristotle: I, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952] DA/JAS; Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred [Penguin Books, 1986].

Metaphysics: Translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle [Peripatetic Press, 1982] M/HGA.

Other works:

Conjectures and Refutations, by Karl R. Popper [Routledge, 1989].

The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I , by Karl R. Popper; [Princeton U. Press, 1986].

The Self and Its Brain, by Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles [Routledge, 1995].

A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, by Frederick Copleston, S.J. [Newman Press, 1950].

The Time of Our Lives, by Mortimer J. Adler [Fordham U. Press, 1996].


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