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Aristotle's Spurned Legacy, by George J. Irbe
(con't)
Aristotle's views on God and the soul
Through the ages, most Western scholars have
viewed Aristotle's concept of God and the soul
rather disparagingly. For Aristotle, they say, God
is the distant and uninvolved Prime Mover and the
soul is simply a property of something that is
alive, and therefore it is as mundane and of no
more consequence than a biological property of the
living being. Aristotle's concept has nothing in
common with the immortal soul of man as envisioned
by the three monotheistic religions which share the
same roots in the Bible. It has been convenient for
Western scholars, even those of agnostic or
atheistic bent, to keep Aristotle's concept of God
and soul out of the picture, so to speak, because
of course -- and this whether one believes in the
biblical God and soul, or does not -- the biblical
model is the one and only genuine transcendental
model of God and the human soul that one is
supposed to recognize as such. Any other philosophy
about God and the disposition of the human soul is
paganistic and therefore unworthy of serious
consideration. This narrow-mindedness, this tunnel
vision, has prevailed through the centuries to our
day, much to the detriment of Western thought.
The consensus view of Aristotle's understanding
of God is stated very well by Frederick Copleston
in A History of Philosophy, Vol. I :
- The First Mover, being immaterial, cannot
perform any bodily action: His action must be
purely spiritual, and so intellectual. In other
words, God's activity is one of thought. But
what is the object of His thought? Knowledge is
intellectual participation of the object: now,
God's object must be the best of all possible
objects, and in any case the knowledge enjoyed
by God cannot be knowledge that involves change
or sensation or novelty. God therefor knows
himself in an eternal act of intuition or
self-consciousness. Aristotle, then, defines God
as "Thought of Thought." God is subsistent
thought, which eternally thinks itself. (p.
316)
-
- Aristotle may not have spoken of the First
Mover as being personal, and certainly the
ascription of anthropomorphic personality would
be very far indeed from his thoughts, but since
the First Mover is Intelligence or Thought, it
follows that He is personal in the philosophic
sense. The Aristotelian God may not be personal
secundum nomen, but He is personal
secundum rem. . . . there is no
indication that Aristotle ever thought of the
First Mover as an object of worship, still less
as a Being to Whom prayers might profitably be
addressed. And indeed, if Aristotle's God is
entirely self-centered, as I [Copleston]
believe Him to have been, then it would be out
of the question for men to attempt personal
intercourse with Him. In the Magna Morlia
Aristotle says expressly that those are wrong
who think that there can be a friendship towards
God. For (a) God could not return our love, and
(b) we could not in any case be said to love
God. (p. 317)
-
- . . . Aristotle leaves out of account that
Divine operation in the world . . . which is an
essential element in any satisfactory rational
theology. The Aristotelian God is efficient
Cause only by being the final Cause. He does not
know this world and no Divine plan is fulfilled
in this world: the teleology of nature can be
nothing more than unconscious teleology (at
least this is the only conclusion that will
really fit in with the picture of God given in
the Metaphysics). (p. 319)
Aristotle's conjectures about the character of
God are described accurately enough in the above
quotes from Copleston. However, Copleston shows
that he is as hung up as any other Western scholar
always has been on the dogmatic belief that a
"satisfactory rational theology" must be based on
Divine intervention in the world of man. By
"rational theology" he means, of course, the three
bible-based religions: Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam. If there is no myth associated with it, if
there are no religious rituals and objects, if God
is not worshiped in a synagogue, church, or mosque,
it is not "satisfactory rational theology."
As for the soul, Copleston's remarks on De
Anima in Chapter XXX of the History are
also true to Aristotle's views. For Aristotle the
soul is "the vital principle of living things"; it
is "the cause and principle of the living body, (a)
as a source of movement, (b) as a final cause, and
(c) as the real substance (i.e. formal cause) of
animated bodies." There are different types of
soul, the lowest being the nutritive or vegetative
soul, the highest the human soul. The human soul
has all the attributes of the lower souls and in
addition it has the power of intellect. Aristotle
thought that of the several parts of the soul, all
others die when the body dies, but "the active
intellect is immortal."
The immortal "active" intellect part of the soul
has been translated into English as "mind"; the
pertinent passage from De Anima reads:
- Mind is not at one time knowing and at
another not. When mind is set free from its
present conditions it appears as just what it is
and nothing more; this alone is immortal and
eternal (we do not, however, remember its former
activity because, while the mind in this sense
is impassible, mind as passive is destructible),
and without it nothing thinks. (DA/JAS,
430a22-25)
When I read the above passage for the first
time, I immediately thought of the philosophical
consistency in Aristotle's conjectures about both
God and the human soul (the part which he called
the "active intellect"). The consistency is
demonstrated by the following passage from the
Metaphysics:
- Is it not the case that what has no matter
is indivisible, like human intellect, or even
that which is thinking of a composite object in
an interval of time? For it does not possess
goodness in this part or in that part but
possesses the highest good in the whole, though
it is distinct from it. It is in this manner
that Thinking is the thinking of Himself through
all eternity. (M/HGA, 1075a07-10)
It was a pleasant surprise to me to realize how
compatible is Aristotle's concept of God and soul
as immaterial entities with my own belief in the
immaterial Creator God - "a being that which no
greater can be thought of" after Anselm, and my
belief in the immaterial soul, after Popper and
Eccles, in The Self and Its Brain. Aristotle
and I are separated by a gap of 2400 years in
knowledge and understanding of the Creator's
universe. Consider what Aristotle had to work with
as the prevailing hypothesis of the universe,
described by Copleston in A History of
Philosophy:
- Aristotle maintained the view that the
earth, spherical in shape [at least it was
not flat!, G.I.], is at rest in the centre
of the universe, and that around it lie the
layers, concentric and spherical, of water, air
and fire or the warm. Beyond these lie the
heavenly spheres, the outermost of which, that
of the fixed stars, owes its motion to the First
Mover. Assuming from Calippus the number
thirty-three as the number of spheres which must
be presupposed in order to explain the actual
motion of the planets, Aristotle assumed also
twenty-two backward-moving spheres, interposed
between the other spheres, in order to
counteract the tendency of a sphere to disturb
the motion of the planet in the next encompassed
sphere.(p. 326)
I cogitate on how Aristotle would re-define his
First Mover, if, instead of struggling with the
heavenly spheres, he had our knowledge and
understanding (incomplete, but surely better than
what was known and understood 2400 years ago) of
the composition of matter down to its smallest
particles and of the indistinguishability of matter
from energy at these levels; and if his conjectures
were based on our current hypotheses about the
creation and the structure of the universe and on
our observations of the on-going dynamic processes
within it. I am convinced that Aristotle would
propose a First Mover very similar to the
Creator-God I believe in.
I share Aristotle's belief that the soul is the
vital principle of living things, and the only
difference in our respective beliefs is that I
consider the human soul (and all other souls of
living things) to be indivisible unities whereas
Aristotle divides the soul into parts. I believe
that the immaterial soul can survive the physical
death of the body, but Aristotle believes that only
the active intellect, or the "mind" part of the
soul survives -- one might say that the
Aristotelian "active intellect" unites,
appropriately enough, with the "Thought of
Thought." Aristotle is also known for his
scientific investigations, particularly in biology.
I'm sure that today Aristotle would have no
difficulty in modifying his ideas on the several
parts of the soul to fit our modern knowledge in
molecular biology. For example, Hugh Lawson-Tancred
notes in his translation of De Anima (p.
164) that many scientists agree that the "formal
cause" function of Aristotle's soul presages the
role of DNA in modern biology.
A proper and fair assessment of a person's
philosophy -- particularly concerning
transcendental matters -- should be based, first of
all, on the person's major philosophical premises.
The details surrounding these premises are of
secondary importance; they are bound to reflect the
conventional knowledge and understanding of the
time. I understand Aristotle's major premises to
be: (a) God is the Supreme Being, encompassing all
that is good, (b) living things have a soul, and
(c) there is a natural common-sense code of ethics
and morals which men should live by in order to
approach the state of goodness of the Divine.
I am certain that Aristotle was a good man, fair
and law-abiding. He had to be to be the author of
the Nicomachean Ethics. There is one passage
in the Ethics that I find particularly
expressive of Aristotle's major premises. The
following is from a mix of translations by W. D.
Ross, J.A.K. Thomson and T. Irwin:
- Now we take the human function to be a
certain kind of life, and take this life to be
the soul's activity and actions that express
reason, and the function of a good man to be the
good and noble performance of these. Each
function is completed well when its completion
expresses the proper virtue. Therefore, the
human good turns out to be the soul's activity
that expresses virtue. And if there are more
virtues than one, the good will express the best
and most complete virtue. (N, 1098a13-18)
Aristotle repeated the same advice in Politics,
when he was making the point that in order to have
a good political community, there must first of all
be good citizens:
- Accordingly, since the soul is indeed more
honorable then the body or external possessions,
both without qualification and to us, the best
position of the soul, too, is of necessity
analogously related to the best position of the
body or of those possessions. Further, external
goods and those of the body are chosen by nature
for the sake of the soul and should be so chosen
by all men of good judgment, but the soul is not
chosen for the sake of these goods. Now let us
acknowledge that the extent to which we become
happy corresponds to the extent to which our
virtues and prudence and the actions according
to these are present, and let us acknowledge as
a witness also God, who is happy and blessed not
because of any external goods but because of
Himself and His kind of nature. (P/HGA,
1323b16-25)
Aristotle states that God is eternal and
encompasses all that is good; good that we only
attain on occasion and never as perfectly as God
does:
- If, then, the manner of God's existence is
as good as ours sometimes is, but eternally,
then this is marvelous, and if it is better,
this is still more marvelous; and it is the
latter. And life belongs to God, for the
actuality of the intellect is life, and He is
actuality; and His actuality is in virtue of
itself as life which is the best and is eternal.
We say that God is a living being which is
eternal and the best; so life and continuous
duration and eternity belong to God, for this is
God (M/HGA, 1072b25 -- 1072b30).
However, even though men are but animals,
Aristotle exhorts them to never cease, through the
power of their reason, to live a good and virtuous
life and to bring forth that Divine goodness which
is in them in order to achieve immortality of their
soul:
- If reason is divine, then, in comparison
with man, the life according to it is divine in
comparison with human life. But we must not
follow those who advise us, being men, to think
of human things, and being mortal, of mortal
things, but must so far as we can, make
ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to
live in accordance with the best things in us;
for even if it be small in bulk, much more does
it in power and worth surpass everything.
(N/WDR, 1177b29-1178a02)
It seems to me that Aristotle's ideas about God
were in a state of flux. That does not surprise me,
in view of the unreal and even childish hypotheses
of the universe which prevailed in his time. In
Book XII of the Metaphysics Aristotle
struggles with the cumbersome "heavenly spheres"
and their "Prime Mover." In the above passage from
the Nicomachean Ethics, where he deals with
human emotions and values, he is thinking of God as
the embodiment of ideal goodness which men must
strive to emulate. Which leads me to wonder what
heights of development this Aristotelian concept of
God could have reached in the subsequent 2400 years
up to our day, had it not been smothered and
superseded by the dogma of the biblical God.
Aristotle's spurned legacy
If Aristotle's thoughts, as expressed in his
lectures and writings, are evaluated while keeping
in mind the political and social circumstances in
which he had to try to make a good life for himself
while upholding his standards of virtue, then one
can conclude that Aristotle made a marvelous job of
it. He understood the nature of man and knew that
man was capable of being the worst of all animals,
as has already been noted. Aristotle also knew how
difficult it is to habituate men to live a good,
virtuous life, but he never stopped trying to
convince them to do so. Toward the end of the
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the
problem and even recommends the use of the law, if
necessary, to compel parents and teachers to
provide the right up-bringing to children:
- Now some think that we are made good by
nature, others by habituation, others by
teaching. Nature's part evidently does not
depend on us, but as a result of some divine
cause is present in those who are truly
fortunate; while argument and teaching, we may
suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the
soul of the student must first have been
cultivated by means of habits for noble joy and
noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish the
seed. For he who lives as passion directs will
not hear argument that dissuades him, nor
understand it if he does; and how can we
persuade one in such a state to change his ways?
And in general passion seems to yield not to
argument but to force. The character, then, must
somehow be there already with a kinship to
virtue, loving what is noble and hating what is
base. But it is difficult to get from youth up a
right training for virtue if one has not been
brought up under right laws; for to live
temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most
people, especially when they are young. For this
reason their nurture and occupations should be
fixed by law. (N/WDR, 1179b20-35)
The Nicomachean Ethics is a truly awesome
achievement by one man. It is the only practical
and purely secular (and therefore the only
worthwhile one, in my opinion) framework for a
moral and ethical code of conduct. No one can
testify to this with more authority than Mortimer
J. Adler, who is a life-long student of Aristotle
and who has used the Aristotelian framework to
create just such a code for our own modern times.
In Adler's words, from The Time of Our
Lives:
- . . . the Nicomachean Ethics is a
unique book in the Western tradition of moral
philosophy. As Aristotle is uniquely the
philosopher of common sense, so his moral
philosophy is uniquely the ethics of common
sense. It is the only ethics that is both
teleological and deontological, the only ethics
that is sound, practical, and undogmatic,
offering what little normative wisdom there is
for all men to be guided by, but refraining from
laying down rules of conduct to cover the
multifarious and contingent circumstances of
human action. In the history of Western moral
thought, it is the only book centrally concerned
and concerned throughout with the goodness of a
whole human life, with the parts of this whole,
and with putting the parts together in the right
order and proportion. As far as I know, its only
parallel is to be found outside of Western
culture in the moral teachings of Confucius,
which address themselves to the same problem and
which offer a solution to it that also refines
the wisdom of common sense. (p. 236)
Let me now repeat what I understand Aristotle's
major premises to be: (a) God is the Supreme Being,
encompassing all that is good, (b) living things
have a soul, and (c) there is a natural
common-sense code of ethics and morals which men
should live by in order to approach the state of
goodness of the Divine. I will be bold enough to
claim that even if Aristotle expressed these
premises somewhat differently, in line with the
knowledge of his time, today he would re-state them
in words very similar to mine.
I have stated the three main premises in their
conventional hierarchy of precedence. But,
curiously enough (and I feel that Aristotle would
agree with me), the third one which posits a
natural moral and ethical code for men is the most
important of the three. Because, if men cannot
first of all decide on what they must do to make
themselves human, contemplation about whether God
and soul exist or not becomes as unnecessary for
man as it is for other animals.
The above sets the stage for my argument about
Aristotle's legacy to mankind which mankind has
chosen to spurn. Let's first recall Copleston's
remarks about the lack of Divine operation in the
world in Aristotle's philosophy about God, and that
this lack excludes Aristotle's view of God from the
classification of "satisfactory rational theology."
In my opinion, the dubious "satisfaction" and the
fraudulent "rationality" of the theology that
Copleston is talking about, i.e. Judaism, Islam,
and Christianity, are based on the fact that morals
and ethics are dictatorial edicts laid down by God;
they are to be practiced by men not -- as Aristotle
claims -- because men's common sense and reason
tells them that it is good to do so, but because
God commands them to do so. This God was
conceptualized by an obscure tribe of the middle
East. In order to flatter their own ego and please
their own (very natural and human) selfish wants,
they further conceived of this God as their Father,
and themselves exclusively as His children. This
God was paternal, tribal, and also personal; He
protected the individual and the tribe from danger,
and provided for their material needs. With this
paternalistic God to back one up, one could compete
fiercely with other tribes and other gods in the
game of "my god is better than your god."
This God, being like a father to you, also loves
you personally, and because He loves you, He will
forgive you for breaking His moral commandments, if
you worship Him, plead with Him, pray to Him, ask
for His forgiveness, etc. It is on this very point
that Aristotle's moral code is unpalatable to the
believers in the biblical God.
Aristotle says that there is something of the
Divine in men and asks men to use their common
sense and their natural ability to tell good from
bad and right from wrong, so that they may live a
good life and strive to be as good as God is. The
onus is entirely on man. If man acts contrary to
the code, he acts contrary to the natural code for
man's behavior. There is no one to forgive him for
breaking it; therefore, he cannot act contrary to
the code again and again and, having in each case
shown the proper contrition, still feel that he is
a good man living a good life. But that is
precisely how man can misuse, usually to some
selfish advantage, the moral code prescribed by the
very personal and paternalistic biblical God; he
can still feel that he is a good man even after any
number of evil deeds, because he has asked for
God's forgiveness after committing the evil
deeds.
The biblical religions offer what Aristotle
cannot: a personal and paternal God who loves one
and forgives one's immoral and evil acts, and, in
the later development of these religions, promises
one immortality in heaven or paradise. The biblical
religions are religions of convenience, whereas
Aristotle offers no convenient ways to evade moral
responsibility, nor a convenient route to
immortality. Therefore, it is not surprising that
Western man chose the biblical God as his model and
turned away from the philosophical model of the
natural God (a non-dogmatic concept open to further
development, understanding, and perfection) which
was taking shape in the Greek civilization.
Thus was Aristotle's legacy of a code of morals
and ethics and his incipient hypotheses about God
and the soul spurned by Western civilization. It
was a great mistake to do so. One need only tune in
to the latest news from the middle East to realize
how great was the mistake.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works by Aristotle:
Nicomachean Ethics: Translated by H.
Rackham [Loeb Classical Library] N/HR;
Translated by W.D. Ross [Great Books of the
Western World #9 -- Aristotle: II, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1952] N/WDR.
Politics: Translated by Benjamin Jowett
[Great Books of the Western World #9 --
Aristotle: II, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952]
P/BJ; Translated by Hippocrates G. Apostle
[Peripatetic Press, 1986] P/HGA.
De Anima: Translated by J.A. Smith
[Great Books of the Western World #8 --
Aristotle: I, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952]
DA/JAS; Translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred
[Penguin Books, 1986].
Metaphysics: Translated by Hippocrates G.
Apostle [Peripatetic Press, 1982]
M/HGA.
Other works:
Conjectures and Refutations, by Karl R.
Popper [Routledge, 1989].
The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I
, by Karl R. Popper; [Princeton U. Press,
1986].
The Self and Its Brain, by Karl R. Popper
and John C. Eccles [Routledge, 1995].
A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, by
Frederick Copleston, S.J. [Newman Press,
1950].
The Time of Our Lives, by Mortimer J.
Adler [Fordham U. Press, 1996].
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Mr. Irbe's Website: Classical
Liberal George
E-mail Address: George
J. Irbe
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