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How It All Comes Together: God - Life - Soul, by
George J. Irbe
Page 2
The co-author of The Self and Its Brain,
John C. Eccles is a distinguished neuroscientist
and Nobel laureate. He has thorough and copious
experience with mind-body interaction phenomena. He
is much more inclined to believe in the possibility
of the self-conscious mind, or soul, surviving the
physical death of the brain. Eccles expresses his
feeling in eloquent fashion in Dialogue XI:
- The self-conscious mind is responsible for
the act of attention, selecting from all the
immense activities of our brain, the neural
bases of our experience from moment to moment.
The unity of conscious experience with all its
perceptual qualities is also there in memory and
in the other higher aspects of mental activity.
But the self-conscious mind is not just
receiving. In all these respects, both in the
perceptual side and in the higher intellectual
side, it is actively engaged in modifying the
brain. So it is in a dynamically active
relationship with the brain and undoubtedly has
a position of superiority. [3, Dialogue
XI]
Eccles then proceeds to pose the age-old
questions, answers to which must largely be left to
belief:
- I wanted to stress this pre-eminence of the
self-conscious mind because now I raise the
questions: What is the self-conscious mind? How
does it come to exist? How is it attached to the
brain in all its intimate relationships of give
and take? How does it come to be? And in the
end, not only how does it come to be, but what
is its ultimate fate when, in due course, the
brain disintegrates? [3, Dialogue
XI]
Of course, neither Karl Popper the philosopher,
nor John Eccles the neurologist can answer these
questions by purely rational reasoning. But Eccles
expresses an optimistic conjecture (of faith, that
is) which is also very much my own, in the
following statements:
- I will read just a paragraph from my book
Facing Reality, on page 83. "I believe
that there is a fundamental mystery in my
existence, transcending any biological account
of the development of my body (including my
brain) with its genetic inheritance and its
evolutionary origin; and, that being so, I must
believe similarly for each human being. And just
as I can't give a scientific account of my
personal origin -- I woke up in life as it were
to find myself existing as an embodied self with
this body and brain -- so I cannot believe that
this wonderful gift of a conscious existence has
no further future, no possibility of another
existence under some other unimaginable
conditions." ... I try, as it were, to face up
fully to the wonder, to the terror, and to the
adventure of my self-conscious life. All of
these words can be used, but ultimately it's
beyond my imagination or power of
expression.
-
- I believe that there is some incredible
mystery about [life after death]. What
does this life mean: firstly coming-to-be, then
finally ceasing-to-be? We find ourselves here in
this wonderful rich and vivid conscious
experience and it goes on through life, but what
is the end? This self-conscious mind of ours has
this mysterious relationship with the brain and
as a consequence achieves experiences of human
love and friendship, of the wonderful natural
beauties, and of the intellectual excitement and
joy given by appreciation and understanding of
our cultural heritages. Is this present life all
to finish in death or can we hope that there
will be further meaning to be discovered? ... I
think there is complete oblivion about the
future, but we come from oblivion. Is it that
this life of ours is simply an episode of
consciousness between two oblivions, or is there
some further transcendent experience of which we
know nothing? I think I'd leave these questions
open at this time.
-
- The self-conscious mind is to my way of
thinking in a position of superiority over the
brain in World 1. It is intimately associated
with it and of course it is dependent on the
brain for all detailed memories, but in its
essential being it may rise superior to the
brain as we have proposed in creative
imagination. Thus there may be some central
core, the inmost self, that survives the death
of the brain to achieve some other existence
which is quite beyond anything we can imagine.
The uniqueness of individuality that I
experience myself to have cannot be attributed
to the uniqueness of my DNA inheritance, ... Our
coming-to-be is as mysterious as our
ceasing-to-be at death. Can we therefore not
derive hope because our ignorance about our
origin matches our ignorance about our destiny?
Cannot life be lived as a challenging and
wonderful adventure that has meaning to be
discovered?" [3, Dialogue XI].
Eccles concludes his statement of faith by
quoting a fellow neuroscientist:
- I would like to add a quotation from Wilder
Penfield [1969], the great
neuroscientist and neurosurgeon. "The physical
basis of the mind is the brain action in each
individual; it accompanies the activity of the
spirit, but the spirit is free; it is capable of
some degree of initiative." Penfield goes on to
say: "The spirit is the man one knows. He must
have continuity through periods of sleep and
coma. I assume, then, that this spirit must live
on somehow after death. I cannot doubt that many
make contact with God and have guidance from a
greater spirit. But these are personal beliefs
that every man must adopt for himself. If he had
only a brain and not a mind, this difficult
decision would not be his." [3, Dialogue
XI].
I wholeheartedly subscribe to John Eccles
belief. His question whether "this life of ours is
simply an episode of consciousness between two
oblivions, or is there some further transcendent
experience of which we know nothing" is also a
statement to the effect that it makes no sense to
have an episode of consciousness between two
oblivions. Surely, then, it also would make no
sense to the Supreme Being, the Creator.
C. A theory of linkage
of life and soul
I will now proceed to state, in as reasoned a
way as I can, my conjectures and beliefs about what
I have covered so far. The morality and natural law
aspects are best discussed afterwards.
The catalyst for my "epiphany" which I recounted
at the start of this essay was the concept of
exnihilation. It was my "missing link" in the
sequence of necessary facts and conjectures that
would knit all the parts into a whole. I will argue
that my missing link -- exnihilation -- is actually
a more honest conjecture than the missing link of
the Darwinians, by which legerdemain (never mind
that it can't be found, just imagine that it was
there once) they would like to prove the evolution
of one species from another. The Burgess shale
tells us that the Darwinian missing link(s) are
entirely unnecessary. But exnihilation, or an
equivalent of it, like the "big bang", is essential
for us to set a beginning to everything.
Like most people, I have to start my argument
with a statement of pure belief. I believe that
there is a Creator or Supreme Being. Along with
Anselm and Mortimer Adler I believe that "God is a
being that which no greater can be thought of"
[1, ch. 8, p.70].
I also agree with Adler that God is not my
personal minder, an anthropomorphic image with an
unkempt beard, but rather, as Adler writes:
- To acknowledge God's omnipotence and
omniscience, as we must, is to acknowledge that
he knows and understands us better than we
understand ourselves, that nothing about us is
hidden from him, and that, within the bounds of
possibility, he can do with us as he wills. ...
However, to acknowledge this is not to be
assured that God is concerned with our conduct
or cares what happens to us. [1, Epilogue,
p.167].
Adler delineates the boundary (which he calls a
chasm) between reason and faith concerning men's
expectations from God; expectations which are much
greater, more particular, and very individualistic
when the belief in God is based in religion. Adler
says that,
- ... subjects that are treated in sacred
theology can have no place in natural theology
or philosophical inquiry. They lie beyond the
power of reason to consider when rational
inquiry is conducted in a pagan context and is,
therefore, totally unilluminated and undirected
by religious faith. As compared with the
thickness of sacred theology, natural theology
is very, very thin. ... Purely philosophical
theology begins with the consideration of all
the prerequisites of a cautious and critical
inquiry concerning God's existence, and
terminates with a cautious and critical
appraisal of how far it can go in providing
reasonable grounds for belief in God. It can go
no further. It carries us up to the edge of the
chasm that separates what Pascal called "the God
of the philosophers" from "the God of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob", and of Moses, Jesus, and
Mohammed. [1, ch.17, p.154]
My belief is mostly in "the God of the
philosophers", but I do step over the boundary, or
chasm, just a little bit. Adler says:
- ... the cosmological argument ... enabled us
to conclude that we have reasonable grounds for
believing in God as exnihilator of the cosmos -
either positively, by sustaining it in existence
and preventing it from being reduced to
nothingness, or creatively, by bringing it into
existence out of nothing, or both creatively and
preservatively. [1, ch.18, p.164]
Adler explains that exnihilation, the making of
something out of nothing, "... involves the action
of a supernatural cause. No natural cause
exnihilates anything, either creatively or
preservatively.[1, ch.14, p.132].
I believe that God -- to put it very simply --
"runs this universe" like the manager of a large
enterprise. A manager delegates authority to his
assistants. God delegates his authority to a set of
dynamic, self-enforcing laws, which operate as a
multitude of "if - then" statements in a
perpetually-running computer program. In my
opinion, this concept, which fits into the concept
of God as sustainer of the cosmos, is not that big
a step from reason into faith. My other departure
from the rational is the conjecture of on-going
acts of exnihilation of incorporeal souls. I would
like to argue that God's exnihilation of
incorporeal souls is another form of the creative
process; it is different from the creative
exnihilation of the physical universe in that what
is exnihilated is not physical or material, nor is
it in any sense understandable to us.
I can return now to the incident which provided
me with the sudden understanding of the
interconnectedness of all these things. I was
pondering upon CK's question about when does an
individual's soul commence to be. CK, being a
Christian, of course was referring only to the soul
of a human being.
A series of concepts assembled themselves
quickly in my mind. Aristotle believed that all
living things have a soul, and he defined as a
living thing one that has one or more of the
following faculties: nutritive, perceptive,
desirative, locomotive and intellective. Some
living things have only the nutritive faculty,
others also the perceptive.
Let us recall what Popper says of Aristotle's
conjecture about the soul:
- Aristotle too has a theory of lower
(irrational) and higher (rational) parts of the
soul; but his theory is biologically rather than
ethically inspired. The irrational souls or
essences of Aristotle may be said to be
anticipations of modern gene theory: like DNA
they plan the actions of the organism and steer
it to its telos, to its perfection. Aristotle's
psychology does possess the notion of the
self-consciousness of self. [3, ch. P5, sec.
46]
In other words, Aristotle saw the soul as having
parts whose functions ranged from the very basic
biological ones to complex intellectual ones.
Aristotle himself says that "the thing is alive if,
for instance, there is intellect or perception or
spatial movement connected with nourishment and
growth and decay." [4, Bk 2, ch.2]. But
perhaps the most significant statement of all in
De Anima follows shortly thereafter. It
talks of different kinds of souls, some being
separable from the body upon death and immortal,
others being the kind that die along with the body.
In Aristotle's words:
- But nothing is yet clear on the subject of
the intellect and the contemplative faculty.
However, it seems to be another kind of soul,
and this alone admits of being separated, as
that which is eternal from that which is
perishable, while it is clear from these remarks
that the other parts of the soul are not
separable, as some assert them to be, though it
is obvious that they are conceptually distinct.
[4, Bk 2, ch.2].
I arranged Aristotle's "faculties" of a living
thing in what to me was the most logical order of
sophistication, that is: nourishment, growth,
locomotion, perception, intellect, reasoning. The
unique property of a living thing is that it
exercises these faculties on its own internal
volition. The only thing that can provide this
internal volition is the soul. Thus, to answer CK's
question re the egg and the sperm, I conjecture
that an incorporeal proto-soul is exnihilated by
the Creator to the biological host at the moment
when the fertilized egg begins the process of
nourishment and growth that eventually leads to the
first division of the cell. I consider this soul --
which I call a proto-soul -- to be at this initial
stage at the same basic, primitive level as the
basic incipient life form itself.
The nature and potential of the exnihilated
proto-soul is tailored to the expectations of the
genetic code of the life form in question. Let us
recall that the genetic codes for all imaginable
life forms on earth, above the simple proto-life
form, appeared simultaneously (by a statistically
impossible miracle, or an act of exnihilation?,
take your choice). Each life form aims for what is
its perfection. For man it is as stated in the
Nicomachean Ethics [5]. Simpler life
forms have comparably less demanding perfections to
achieve. My confidence in my conjecture is
reinforced by Karl Popper's comment that:
- The irrational souls or essences of
Aristotle may be said to be anticipations of
modern gene theory: like DNA they plan the
actions of the organism and steer it to its
telos, to its perfection. [3, ch. P5, sec.
46].
Continuing with my conjecture: The development
of the proto-soul into a soul and then into a
mature soul proceeds in tandem with the growth and
maturation of its biological host. As the genetic
and biological complexity of the host, determined
by its DNA, increases, so does the extent of
development of, and demands on, its soul. As the
standards of perfection grow more complex along
with the more complex biological host, so does its
vulnerability to external factors which can hinder
the development of both the soul and the biological
host, or destroy both entirely. The soul is obliged
to develop more sophisticated responses and
counter-moves to the more complex threats to the
perfection of its biological host. The soul does
not always measure up to the challenge. We all have
heard, or have used, the expression "it/he/she has
lost the will to live." By this we mean that the
soul of that plant or animal or human has
succumbed.
At this point I must divide further discussion
of the life-soul linkage between that of other life
forms on earth, and humans. We have indeed been
endowed with an exceptional soul which merits its
own, separate discussion.
Let me first describe how my hypothesis applies
to the lower life forms. I am going to do that in a
fashion reminiscent of the ancient Greek
philosophers, thereby demonstrating that their
methods still have utility today.
I begin with the simple unicellular life. Its
perfection is simply to be a perfect cell and, as
is the case with most unicellular life, to achieve
growth by dividing itself. The demand on its soul
is small: develop into the perfect cell and then
divide and be annihilated. Two new souls are
exnihilated for the two new cells each of which
repeats the simple cycle of exnihilation - division
- annihilation.
Next, lets look at a tiny animal called a
radiolarium. The radiolarium builds a perfect
spherical skeleton whose surface consists of an
exquisite, perfectly-patterned geometrical frame.
It seems logical to me to conclude that the demand
on the soul of the radiolarium, however primitive
otherwise, is substantial in that it is in charge
of the building of this geometrically perfect
skeleton.
It is not necessary to dwell in detail on how
the responsibility of the soul increases in more
complex life forms. The tree is a complex form of
plant life; its soul must guide its complex
biological system to the perfect state of maturity,
guiding the growth of roots and branches to best
advantage for exploiting energy from the sun and
the moisture and nourishment from the soil.
When we come to the complex biological life
forms of birds and mammals, the soul must manage a
sentient organism with a very complicated pattern
of existence. This soul has consciousness and a
level of intellect and reasoning. It must manage
its biological host through the complexities of
gestating, birthing, nourishing, rearing and
teaching the young; through the gathering of, or
hunting for, food, and storing of the food for
later use; through seeking or building of shelter
against the elements. This soul, if it can develop
unimpeded by internal genetic defects, or external
agents (e.g. an impediment being the bird or mammal
being placed in a cage), seeks the perfection in
all the aspects pertinent to its biological host.
The perfect life for a bird or mammal is to be
physically strong and healthy, to be a smart and
capable gatherer or hunter of food, to be a good
rearer and educator of one's progeny.
Man, too, is a mammal, so, in order to meet the
basic needs common to mammals, the soul of man must
also strive for the attainment of perfection of its
human host by using the same survival skills that
are important to the souls of other mammals.
However, man's soul is a very special exnihilated
creation; its perfection culminates in
self-consciousness, which is not the case for other
mammals whose souls have only consciousness. This
self-consciousness is what sets man apart from all
other living things.
The self-conscious mind, or soul of man has been
discussed at length by Popper and Eccles
[3], some passages from which I have quoted
above. Eccles presents a schematic diagram of
brain-mind interaction; he lists the several names
-- ego, self, soul, will -- by which this enigmatic
incorporeal entity is known. The schematic shows
the soul to be interacting with a specific area of
the brain, called the liaison brain. [3, ch.
E7, sec.50].
We say that self-consciousness of the mind or
soul is what differentiates us from other animals.
But what exactly do we mean by that? It is
basically an awareness by the self that he/she is
an individual. Now, I have conjectured that the
soul of every life form starts out as an
exnihilated proto-soul, with a potential for
development proportionate to the genetic make-up of
its biological host. The highest level of
development, and one unique to the human soul, is
self-consciousness. Therefore, the human soul must
undergo a considerable development to reach its
full potential. Popper puts it this way:
- Is a new-born baby a self? Yes and no. It
feels: it is capable of feeling pain and
pleasure. But it is not yet a person in the
sense of Kant's two statements: "A person is a
subject that is responsible for his actions",
and "A person is something that is conscious, at
different times, of the numerical identity of
its self." Thus a baby is a body -- a developing
human body -- before it becomes a person, a
unity of body and mind. [3, ch. P4,
sec.33].
When one thinks of oneself, one is thinking of
something other than one's material body or its
parts. When I think of myself, I do not think of my
brain or my heart. However, I am capable of
thinking of my brain or my heart, and when I do,
I'm thinking of my brain or heart, not of myself.
Therefore, when I think of myself, or of anything
in relation to myself, I am resorting to my
self-consciousness.
In the above quote, Popper refers to Kant's
definition of a person. I assume the definition
applies to a mature individual. I think that the
second criterion, regarding numerical identity of
self, is common to all humans and develops early in
life. The first criterion, regarding responsibility
for one's actions, is ambiguous. I must assume that
it refers to a sense of responsibility by the
person for his/her own actions, not what actions of
that person others might hold them to be
responsible for. An inner sense of responsibility
by a person calls for a much higher level of
development of the soul, and this level of
development is not attained by all human souls.
We have now arrived at the critical point of
discrimination between a human soul that is merely
self-conscious and one that is self-conscious and,
to put it simply, also has a conscience. Conscience
is the understanding by the soul of the difference
between right and wrong thinking and acting, and a
persistent inner force which compels the soul
always to think and do right to the best of one's
ability.
Conscience is both backward- and
forward-looking. It is a faculty that the human
soul is capable of developing for self-examination
as to what it has done and what it will do. It is
the only attribute of the human soul that raises it
above the souls of other life forms. The attribute
of a superior intelligence alone would make man
only a smarter animal. The potential for the
development of a conscience is the unique attribute
inherent in the proto-soul which the Creator
exnihilates to the human genome. This extraordinary
potential is what makes many religious people of
varied faiths think that they are made in the image
of God, or at least are specifically favored by
God, and are made immortal by God.
I believe that the fully-developed, but
incorporeal and self-conscious soul with a
conscience enters into the domain of the logos of
the Creator, and thus avoids the annihilation that
comes to other souls at the moment of physical
death of their biological host.
There is still another question regarding
conscience as the determinant for survivability of
a human's soul: does it matter if, for whatever
reason, a human's soul has functioned without a
conscience for most of that human's lifetime and
then develops one shortly before physical death? I
know that a Christian would answer that it does not
matter; the Christian believes that one's soul can
be "saved" at any time before death. There is the
fact that we all know of some exceptionally cruel
and evil persons who have committed despicable acts
during a part of their life and then have developed
a conscience and spent the rest of their life
expiating the bad deeds of the past with good deeds
now. It seems reasonable to me that a mere
backward-looking regretfulness of past misdeeds
does not translate into a conscience. The
development of a conscience must be demonstrated by
choices, decisions, and deeds over a period of
time. The length of this period of affirmation
would depend on the kind of endeavors and the
intensity of effort the individual is engaged in.
In the final analysis, only the soul itself and its
exnihilator -- the Creator -- know whether it has
or has not developed a conscience.
We know that Eccles believes in the survival of
the soul after physical death of the brain. But
Eccles does not differentiate between souls with
different levels of development. Of course, he is
expressing his belief as a fully developed
self-conscious soul with a conscience. One does not
necessarily have to believe in some form of
immortality of the soul for it to be so for that
soul. Popper is skeptical about immortality of the
soul, but I, for one, consider Popper's soul to
have a fully-developed self-consciousness and
conscience. Popper does concede the possibility of
a state of survival which we cannot even fathom by
stating that he would have to consider seriously
"... those who say that this [immortality]
cannot be just in space and time, and that it
cannot be just a temporal eternity, ..." [3,
Dialogue XI].
To conclude this part on the life-soul linkage,
I quote some advice from Aristotle:
- We must not follow those who advise us,
being men, to think of human things, and, being
mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we
can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every
nerve to live in accordance with the best thing
in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much
more does it in power and worth surpass
everything. That what is best and most pleasant
for a given creature is that which is proper to
it. Therefore for man, too, the best and the
most pleasant life is the life of the intellect,
since the intellect is in the fullest sense the
man. So this life will also be the happiest.
[5, Bk X, ch.7]
To that I would like to add what I quoted
earlier from Aristotle:
- ... we state the function of man to be a
certain kind of life, and this to be an activity
or actions of the soul implying a rational
principle, and the function of a good man to be
the good and noble performance of these, and if
any action is well performed when it is
performed in accordance with the appropriate
excellence: if this is the case, human good
turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting
excellence, and if there are more than one
excellence, in accordance with the best and most
complete. [5, Bk I, ch.7]
I think that I can assume that when Aristotle
talks about straining ourselves to be immortal and
living in accordance with the best thing in us, and
when he says that our life consists of actions of
our soul, and that a good man is so defined by his
good and noble performance, and that human good is
an activity of the soul exhibiting excellence,
Aristotle is saying the same thing as I am, i.e.,
that survival (immortality, if you will) is
achieved by that soul which has developed fully its
self-consciousness and its conscience.
D. How it all comes
together: God, life, soul, natural
law
I recall reading some years ago the book
Natural Law and Natural Rights, by John
Finnis (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980). On page 18
of that book Finnis defines natural law thus: "A
sound theory of natural law is one that ... claims
to be able to identify conditions and principles of
practical right-mindedness, of good and proper
order among men and in individual conduct."
Elsewhere in the book Finnis says that natural law
embodies the practically reasonable, pre-moral
principles of right and wrong which are 'per se
nota' (self-evident). I posed a question at the
time of reading this, which asks whether this
theory of natural law could be the link to other
laws of nature obeyed by the animate and inanimate
components of the universe? To my knowledge, most
thinkers and philosophers about natural law are
adamant in keeping the moral law which applies to
human conduct separate from physical laws of
nature.
Now, having conjectured that the human soul is
but a very special case of the souls that are
exnihilated to all living things, I am inclined
more than ever to say that that which we designate
as the natural law of human conduct is, at the
least, part of the Creator's (natural) laws which
apply to other living things, and most likely the
natural law that applies to living things is just a
sub-set of the set of dynamic, self-enforcing laws
to which, as I said before, God delegates his
authority in the functioning and maintenance of all
his creation. The self-consciousness and conscience
of our souls, along with their greater potential
for developing a high level of intelligence, is
what allows us to comprehend the logic of these
laws, whereas lower life forms without these
attributes of the soul do not enjoy the privilege
of understanding them. Our souls are exnihilated
with a much greater potential for the development
of intelligence than souls of lower life forms.
Therefore, our souls have many more options to
choose from in deciding on a course of action in
response to a particular circumstance in life.
I think that the laws I refer to are identical
with natural laws, and that what Finnis terms the
practically reasonable, pre-moral principles of
right and wrong which are self-evident, are so
described by us because they apply specifically to
us humans. I dispute the term "pre-moral". It is my
contention that the principles of right and wrong
are parts of God's natural laws and as such they
always have been equivalent to -- if one so prefers
-- moral principles.
The Nicomachean Ethics remains, still,
after 2400 years, the most comprehensive,
non-religious treatment of ethics and morals ever
written. A man of our own times, Mortimer J. Adler,
is arguably the greatest-ever expounder and
popularizer of Aristotle's philosophy in general
and Aristotelian ethics in particular. With regard
to the commonsense natural moral philosophy of
Aristotle and Adler, I have yet to come across
anything significant that I would disagree with. I
will conclude making the linkage between the soul
and natural law by drawing on the thoughts of both
men.
Aristotle's understanding of ethics, and Adler's
elaboration of them into a natural moral code, is
based on a few key concepts which I will summarize
and remark on from my perspective of the soul and
natural law. To begin, the purpose of every action
we take is to achieve what we think is some good
for us. This is a self-evident truth, because we
would never deliberately do something that we think
is bad for us. The problem is that we may be
pursuing what is only an apparent good, which could
be innocuous, but could also be empty of value or
even harmful for us, rather than a real good which
we, like every other human being, actually need.
Furthermore, since we obviously must, first of all,
desire something before we pursue it, our choice of
a good must be based on the right desire.
In my view, the right desire for a real good and
the proper means for achieving it can be determined
only by the human soul which has developed a
certain level of intelligence, self-consciousness,
and conscience.
Another of Aristotle's and Adler's key concepts
is that of happiness. We spend our life pursuing
goods that enable us to pursue further goods. But
there is one ultimate end to all the goods that we
pursue, which we seek for its own sake and that is
happiness. Adler says: "So conceived, happiness is
the totum bonum (the whole of goods) ... As
the totum bonum, happiness or a whole good
life is a normative, not a terminal, end -- an end
that takes a complete life to achieve, and
therefore an end that is not achieved at any moment
in the time of our lives." [6, App. II,
p.169]
Here I am going to make a daring comparison of
concepts: I conjecture that Adler's abstract idea
of "happiness" is equivalent to my idea of the
fully developed self-conscious soul with a fully
developed conscience transcending into God's
logos, and by so doing being spared
annihilation.
Of course, men do not make natural law, although
they rely on it when making positive laws of their
own. A law is a form of prescription cloaked in
advice. The gist of a law is the "ought" and/or
"oughtnot" it prescribes. When we deal with natural
law and natural rights we do not prescribe "oughts"
and "oughtnots" by ourselves, which we do when
making positive law; rather, we derive the contents
of the natural "oughts" and "oughtnots" by using
our common sense to deduce them. We interpret the
"oughts" and "oughtnots" by observing the Creator's
natural processes at work and by using our very
capable intelligence to learn what is good and what
is bad for us to do.
Aristotle was a genius with few equals. Among
his many pioneering accomplishments we can include
sociology and psychology. Aristotle was very
insightful in observing and interpreting the
behavior of human beings, and, I would like to add,
his soul had reached such a level of development
that he could perceive, down to the smallest
nuances, practically all of the "oughts" and
"oughtnots" of natural law applicable to human
beings. Aristotle understood the meaning of "good"
and "bad" -- necessary criteria for "ought" and
"oughtnot" prescriptions -- to be indefinable,
primitive and self-evident concepts. I would like
to remark here that their indefinable and
self-evident nature is precisely what identifies
them as concepts of the Creator's natural law and,
therefore, it requires a soul with a well-developed
self-consciousness and conscience to fully
understand them.
Much time had to pass before Mortimer J. Adler
-- another man of genius -- came along to interpret
Aristotle's writings correctly. Adler has expanded
and explained Aristotle's thoughts in
easily-understood language in his many books and
lectures on the subject. Here I will insert some
quotes from Adler's work which, in my opinion, show
the connection between the Aristotelian ethics and
natural law.
- Resting on the distinction between the real
and the apparent good, a basic tenet of the
common-sense view is that what is really good
for any single individual is good in exactly the
same sense for every other human being,
precisely because that which is really good is
that which satisfies desires or needs inherent
in human nature -- the make-up that is common to
all men because they are members of the same
biological species. The totum bonum --
happiness or the good life -- is the same for
all men, and each man is under the same basic
moral obligation as every other -- to make a
good life for himself. [7, ch. 14,
p.140]
- ... when I understand that each real good
and the totum bonum as the sum of all of
them are common goods, the same for all men, I
can then discern the natural rights each
individual has -- rights that others have which
impose moral obligations upon me, and rights
that I have which impose moral obligations upon
others.
-
- Moral rights are natural rights, rights
inherent in man's common or specific nature,
just as his natural desires or needs are. Such
rights, being antecedent to society and
government, may be recognized and enforced by
society or they may be transgressed and
violated, but they are inalienable in the sense
that, not being the gift of legal enactment,
they cannot be taken away or annulled by acts of
government. [7, ch. 14, p.141]
-
- ... the set of basic notions that are
inseparably connected with one another
[are]: (a) natural needs, (b) real
goods, (c) the duties or moral obligations that
I have in the conduct of my own life, (d) moral
or natural rights, and (e) the duties or moral
obligations I have in my conduct toward others.
[7, ch. 4, p.142]
The moral and natural rights and duties cited by
Adler are, in my opinion, the core for the "oughts"
and "oughtnots" of natural law which applies to
humans. Adler implies as much when he says that
they cannot be taken away or annulled by men. I
would like to add to the basic notion in (e) "...
and toward other living things in God's creation."
I think that a human soul has developed its
conscience to the fullest extent only when it
treats other life forms with the same sense of
moral obligation and respect which it must accord
to other humans. I seem to have an instinctive
sense that the natural laws that concern human-kind
are but a component of the entire body of laws
which governs the universe, and which, I believe,
are the active agents instituted by the
exnihilating Creator, also know as God, the Supreme
Being, and by many other comparable
designations.
Recapitulation
To repeat in short form of "how it all comes
together" for me:
(1) there is God, the being that which no
greater can be thought of, who is the exnihilator
of the physical universe;
(2) life is one of God's most unique creations;
its presence in the universe is outside the bounds
of ordinary probabilities;
(3) another of God's unique creative acts is the
exnihilation of all the myriad genetic codes for
all the life forms found on earth (past, present,
and future) some 530 million years ago;
(4) another of God's unique creative acts is the
exnihilation of a soul for every living thing; the
soul is the manager of all activities by the living
thing;
(5) the ultimate of God's creation is the soul
of a human being, which has the potential to
develop self-consciousness and a conscience;
(6) all souls which do not develop a
self-consciousness -- those of animals and plants
-- are annihilated when the living host they
inhabit dies;
(7) the human soul has been given the potential
to develop the intelligence for understanding the
Creator's laws, which we know as natural laws and
which include laws prescribing our own
behavior;
(8) in addition, the human soul has been given
the potential to develop a self-consciousness and
conscience; the soul is obligated to develop both
faculties, because both are essential for the full
understanding of, and for complying with, the
natural laws.
(9) the souls of humans which do not develop
self-consciousness and a conscience are annihilated
upon physical death of their human hosts;
(10) the souls of humans which develop
self-consciousness and a conscience survive the
physical death of their human hosts; the subsequent
disposition of these souls is within the Creator's
logos which is beyond our understanding or
imagination.
I find that I have now arrived back at the
beginning of the story: there is God, the being
that which no greater can be thought of.
Sources
1. How to Think About God, by Mortimer J.
Adler (Macmillan, 1980).
2. The Science of God, by Gerald L.
Schroeder (Free Press, 1997).
3. The Self and Its Brain, by Karl R.
Popper and John C. Eccles (Routledge, 1977).
4. De Anima (On the Soul), by Aristotle,
translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (Penguin Books,
1986).
5. Nicomachean Ethics, by Aristotle,
translated by David Ross (Oxford Univ. Press,
1980).
6. Desires, Right & Wrong, by
Mortimer J. Adler (Macmillan, 1991).
7. The Time of Our Lives, by Mortimer J.
Adler [1970] (reprint by Fordham Univ.
Press, 1996).
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