NATURAL vs.
POSITIVE LAW
Are you a
Naturalist or Positivist?
by Mortimer J. Adler, Ph.D.
Let us first be clear that by "natural law" we
mean principles of human conduct, not the laws of
nature discovered by the physical sciences. Many
thinkers who espouse natural law see it at work in
both the human and nonhuman realms, but their main
interest is in its special application to man.
According to these thinkers, the natural law as
applied to physical things or animals is
inviolable; stars and atoms never disobey the laws
of their nature. But man often violates the moral
rules which constitute the law of his specifically
human nature.
The idea of a natural right order to which all
things, including human beings, should conform is
one of the most ancient and universal notions. It
is a major principle in the religious and
philosophic systems of ancient India and China, as
well as in classical Greek philosophy. Plato calls
it "justice" and applies it to the human soul and
human conduct.
In Western society, especially from the Roman
jurists and the theologians of the Middle Age on,
we find the doctrine of the natural moral law for
man. It is the source of moral standards, the basis
of moral judgments, and the measure of justice in
the man-made laws of the state. If the law of the
state runs counter to the precepts of the natural
law, it is held to be unjust.
The first precept of natural law is to seek the
good and avoid evil. It is often put as follows:
"Do good unto others, injure no one, render to
every man his own." Now, of course, such a general
principle is useless for organized society unless
we can use it to specify various types of rights
and wrongs. That is precisely what man-made, or
positive, law tries to do.
Thus, the natural law tells us only that
stealing is wrong because it inflicts injury, but
the positive law of larceny defines the various
kinds and degrees of theft and prescribes the
punishments therefor.
Such particular determinations may differ in
various times and places without affecting the
principles of natural law. Neither Aquinas nor
Aristotle thinks that particular rules of laws
should be the same in different times, places, and
conditions.
You may ask how the natural law is known.
Through human reason and conscience, answer the
natural-law thinkers. The natural-law doctrine
usually assumes that man has a specific nature
which involves certain natural needs, and the power
of reason to recognize what is really good for man
in terms of these needs.
Christian thinkers, such as Aquinas and John
Locke, think the natural law is of divine origin.
God, in creating each thing, implanted in it the
law of its nature. The phrase about "the laws of
nature and of nature's God" in our Declaration of
Independence derives from this type of natural-law
doctrine. However, this particular theological
viewpoint is not always found in writers who uphold
the natural law, for these include such
pre-Christian thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero, and such modern secular philosophers as
Kant and Hegel.
There has been much opposition to natural-law
philosophy from the very beginning. Indeed, one
might say the opposition came first, for the idea
of natural right or justice was developed in
ancient Greece to counter the views of the
Sophists, who were "conventionalists." These men
believe that law and justice are simply man-made
conventions. No action is right or wrong unless a
particular community, through its positive laws or
customs, decrees that it is right or wrong. Then it
is right or wrong in that particular place and
time--not universally. By nature, the Sophists say,
fire burns in Greece as it does in Persia, but the
laws of Persia and of Greece, being matters of
convention, are not the same. The "conventionalist"
or "positivist" doctrine of law has come down all
the way from the ancient Sophists to many of our
modern law-school professors.
The expression "life, liberty, and property" in
the Fourteenth Amendment reflects the influence of
natural law theory. The Bill of Rights assumes a
doctrine of natural and unalienable rights. "A law
which is not just is a law in name only," says
Augustine. And Aquinas adds: Every human law has
just so much of the nature of law as it is derived
from the law of nature. But if in any point it
departs from the law of nature, it is no longer a
law but a perversion of the law.
The naturalists, as that name indicates, affirm
the existence of natural justice, of natural and
unalienable rights, of the natural moral law, and
of valid prescriptive oughts that elicit our
assent, both independently of and prior to the
existence of positive law. The positivists deny all
this and affirm the opposite. For them, the
positive law--the man-made law of the
state--provides the only prescriptive oughts that
human beings are compelled to obey. According to
them, nothing is just or unjust until it has been
declared so by a command or prohibition of positive
law.
From that flows the further consequence that
there is no natural moral law, no natural rights,
no natural justice, ending up with the conclusion
that man-made law alone determines what is just and
unjust, right and wrong. It was first eloquently
expressed in the opening books of Plato's
"Republic" where Thrasymachus, responding to
Socrates' mention of the view that justice consists
in rendering what is due, declared and defended the
opposite view--that justice is the interest of the
stronger. Spelled out, this means that what is just
or unjust is determined solely by whoever has the
power to lay down the law of the land.
The positivist view is recurrent in later
centuries. It was expressed by the Roman
jurisconsult, Ulpian, who, defending the absolutism
of the Caesars, declared that whatever pleases the
prince has the force of law. Still later, in the
sixteenth century, the same view was set forth by
another defender of absolute government, Thomas
Hobbes, in "The Leviathan"; and later, in the
nineteenth century, by John Austin, in his
"Analytical Jurisprudence."
Neither Austin nor the twentieth-century legal
positivists who follow him regard themselves as
defenders of absolute government. That is what they
are, however--perhaps not as explicitly as their
predecessors, but by implication at least. The
denial of natural rights, the natural moral law,
and natural justice leads not only to the
positivist conclusion that man made law alone
determines what is just and unjust. It also leads
to a corollary which inexorably attaches itself to
that conclusion --that might makes right.
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