|
The
One
by Plotinus
All things that exist do so by virtue of "unity"
-- in so far as they exist in any ultimate sense
and in so far as they may be said to be real. For
what would anything be if it were not "one"?
Without the unity of which we speak things do not
exist. There can be no army which is not a unit,
nor a chorus, nor herd, unless each is "one."
Neither is there a household or ship without unity;
for the house is a unit and the ship is a unit, and
if one took away the unity the household would no
longer be a household nor the ship a ship.
Continuous magnitudes would not exist if there were
no unity to them. When divided, in so far as they
lose unity they lose existence. So also with the
bodies of plants and animals, each of which is a
unit, if unity is lost -- being broken up into
multiplicity -- they lose the being which they had,
and no longer continue as they were. And they
become other things even then only in so far as
these have unity. Similarly there is health when
the body is harmonized into unity, and beauty when
the essence of unity controls the parts, and virtue
in the soul when it is unified and brought into a
single harmonious whole.
There must be something prior to all, simple,
and different from the things which are posterior
to it, self-existent, unmingled with the things
which come from it, and yet able in another way to
be present with the others, being really one, not
something else first then secondarily one of which
it is false even that it is one; but of this One no
description nor scientific knowledge is possible.
Indeed it must be said to be beyond "being"; for if
it were not simple, without any composition and
synthesis, and really one, it would not be a first
principle. And it is wholly self-sufficient by
virtue of its being simple and prior to all things.
What is not first needs that which is prior to
itself, and that which is not simple demands those
simple elements which are within it, that it may be
composed of them. Such a One must be unique, for if
there were another such both together would
constitute a larger unit. For we hold that they are
not two bodies nor is the Primary One a body. For
no body is simple, and a body is subject to
generation; it is not an ultimate principle. The
ultimate principle is unoriginated, and being
incorporeal and really one it is able to stand
first.
Since substances which have an origin are of
some form (for no one could say anything else of
what is generated from the One), and since it is
not any particular form but all, without exception,
the first principle must be formless. And being
formless it is not substance; for substance must be
particular; and a particular is determinate. But
this can not be regarded as particular, for it
would not be a principle, but merely that
particular thing which you may have called it. If
then all things are included among what are
generated, which of them will you say is the first
principle? Only what is none of them could be said
to stand above the rest. But these constitute
existing things and Being in general. The First
Principle then is beyond Being. To say that it is
beyond Being does not assert it to be any definite
thing. It does not define it. Nor does it give it a
name. It applies to it only the appellation
"not-this." In doing so it nowhere sets limits to
it. It would be absurd to seek to delimit such a
boundless nature. He who wishes to do this prevents
himself from getting upon its track in any wise,
even little by little. But just as he who wishes to
see the Intelligible must abandon all imagery of
the perceptible in order to contemplate what is
beyond the perceptible, so he who wishes to
contemplate what is beyond the Intelligible will
attain the contemplation of it by letting go
everything intelligible, through this means
learning that it is, abandoning the search for what
it is. To tell what it is would involve a reference
to what it is not, for there is no quality in what
has no particular character. But we are in painful
doubt as to what we should say of it; so we speak
of the ineffable and give it a name, meaning to
endow it with some significance to ourselves so far
as we can. Perhaps this name "The One" implies
merely opposition to plurality. . . . But if The
One were given positive content, a name and
signification, it would be less appropriately
designated than when one does not give any name. It
may be said that description of it is carried thus
far in order that he who seeks it beginning with
that which indicates the simplicity of all things
may end by negating even this, on the ground that
it was taken simply as the most adequate and the
nearest description possible for him who used it,
but not even this is adequate to the revelation of
that nature, because it is inaudible, not to be
understood through hearing, and if by any sense at
all by vision alone. But if the eye that sees seeks
to behold a form it will not descry even this.
Excerpted from The
Enneads, by Plotinus
|
The
Enneads, by Plotinus
|