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The
Ego
by Johann Gottlieb Fichte
We have to search for the absolute, first, and
unconditioned fundamental principle of human
knowledge. It cannot be proven, nor determined if
it is to be absolute first principle.
This principle is to express that
deed-act which does not occur among the
empirical determinations of our consciousness, nor
can so occur, since it is rather the basis of all
consciousness, and first and alone makes
consciousness possible. In representing this
deed-act it is not so much to be feared that my
readers will not think what they ought to
think, as that they will think what they ought not
to think. This renders necessary a
reflection on what may perhaps for the
present be taken for that deed-act, and an
abstraction from all that does not really
belong to it.
Even by means of this abstracting reflection,
that deed-act, which is not empirical fact of
consciousness, cannot become fact of
consciousness: but by means of this abstracting
reflection we may recognize so much; that this
deed-act must necessarily be thought as the
basis of all consciousness.
The laws according to which this deed-act must
necessarily be thought as basis of human knowledge,
or, which is the same, the rules according to which
that abstracting reflection proceeds, have not yet
been proven as valid, but are for the present
tacitly presupposed as well known and agreed upon.
As we proceed we shall deduce them from that
fundamental principle, the establishment whereof is
correct only if they are correct. This is a circle,
but an unavoidable circle. And since it is
unavoidable and freely admitted, it is also
allowable to appeal to all the laws of general
logic in establishing this highest fundamental
principle.
In undertaking this abstracting reflection, we
must start from some proposition which every one
will admit without dispute. Doubtless there are
many such. We choose the one which seems to us to
open the shortest road to our purpose. In admitting
this proposition, the deed-act, which we intend to
make the basis of our whole science of knowledge,
must be admitted; and the reflection must show
that this deed-act is admitted the moment
that proposition is admitted.
Our course of proceeding in this reflection is
as follows: Any fact of empirical consciousness,
admitted as such valid proposition, is taken hold
of, and from it we separate one of its empirical
determinations after the other, until only that
remains, which can no longer be separated and
abstracted from.
As such admitted proposition we take this one: A
is A.
Every one admits this proposition, and without
the least hesitation. It is recognized by all as
completely certain and evident.
If any one should ask a proof of its certainty,
no one would enter upon such a proof, but would
say: This proposition is absolutely (that is,
without any further ground) certain; and by
saying this would ascribe to himself the power of
absolutely positing something.
In insisting on the in-itself certainty of the
above proposition, you posit not that A
is. The proposition A is A is by no means
equivalent to A is. Being when posited
without predicate is something quite different from
being when posited with a predicate. Let us suppose
A to signify a space enclosed within two straight
lines, then the proposition A is A would still be
correct; although the proposition A is would be
false, since such a space is impossible.
But you posit by that proposition: If A
is, then A is. The question whether A
is at all or not, does not, therefore, occur in it.
The content of the proposition is not
regarded at all: merely its form. The
question is not whereof you know, but what you know
of any given subject. The only thing posited,
therefore, by that proposition is the
absolutely necessary connection between the
two A's. This connection we shall call X.
In regard to A itself nothing has as yet been
posited. The question, therefore, arises: Under
what condition is A?
X at least is in the Ego, and posited
through the Ego, for it is the Ego, which
asserts the above proposition, and so asserts it by
virtue of X as a law, which X or law must,
therefore, be given to the Ego; and, since it is
asserted absolutely, and without further ground,
must be given to the Ego through itself.
Whether and how A is posited we do
not know; but since X is to designate a connection
between an unknown positing of A (of the first A in
the proposition A is A) and a positing of the same
A, which latter positing is absolute on condition
of the first positing, it follows that A, at
least in so far as that connection is posited,
is posited in and through the Ego,
like X. Proof: X is only possible in relation to an
A; now X is really posited in the Ego; hence, also,
A must be posited in the Ego, in so far as X is
related to it.
X is related to that A, in the above
proposition, which occupies the logical position of
subject, and also to that A which is the predicate,
for both are united by X. Both, therefore, are
posited in the Ego, in so far as they are posited;
and the A of the predicate is posited
absolutely if the first one is posited.
Hence the above proposition may be also expressed:
If A is posited in the Ego, then it is
posited, or then it is.
Hence, by means of X, the Ego posits; that A
is absolutely for the asserting Ego, and
is simply because it is posited in the Ego:
or that there is something in the Ego which always
remains the same, and is thus able to connect or
posit: and hence the absolutely posited X may also
be expressed, Ego=Ego, or I am I.
Thus we have already arrived at the proposition
I am; not as expression of a deed-act, it is
true, but, at least, as expression of a
fact.
For X is absolutely posited; this is a fact of
empirical consciousness, as shown by the admitted
proposition. Now X signifies the same as I am I;
hence, this proposition is also absolutely
posited.
But Ego is Ego, or I am I, has quite another
significance than A is A. For the latter
proposition had content only on a certain
condition, namely, if A is posited. But the
proposition I am I is unconditionally and
absolutely valid, since it is the same as X; it is
valid not only in form but also in content. In it
the Ego is posited not on condition, but
absolutely, with the predicate of self-equality;
hence, it is posited, and the proposition may also
be expressed, I am.
This proposition, I am, is as yet only
founded upon a fact, and has no other validity than
that of a fact. If "A=A" (or X) is to be certain,
then "I am" must also be certain. Now, it is fact
of empirical consciousness that we are compelled to
regard X as absolutely certain; hence, also "I am"
is certain, since it is the ground of the X. It
follows from this, that the ground of
explanation of all facts of empirical consciousness
is this: before all positing, the Ego must be
posited through itself.
I say of all facts; and to prove this I
must show that X is the highest fact of empirical
consciousness, is the basis of all others, and
contained in all other facts; which, perhaps, would
be admitted by all men, without proof, although the
whole science of knowledge busies itself to prove
it.
The proposition A is A is asserted. But
all asserting is an act of the human mind; for it
has all the conditions of such an act in empirical
consciousness, which must be presupposed as well
known and admitted in order to advance our
reflection. Now, this act is based on something
which has no higher ground, namely X or I am.
Hence, that which is absolutely posited and
in itself grounded is the ground of a
certain (we shall see hereafter of
all) acting of the human mind; hence its
pure character; the pure character of activity in
itself, altogether abstracting from its particular
empirical conditions.
The positing of the Ego through itself is,
therefore, the pure activity of the Ego. The Ego
posits itself; and the Ego is by virtue of
this mere self-positing. Again, vice versa:
the Ego is and posits its being, by
virtue of its mere being. It is both the acting and
the product of the act; the active and the result
of the activity; deed and act in one; and hence the
I am is expressive of a deed-act; and of the
only possible deed-act, as our science of
knowledge must show.
Let us again consider the proposition I am
I. The Ego is absolutely posited. Let us assume
that the first Ego of this proposition (which has
the position of formal subject) is the
absolutely posited Ego, and that the second
Ego (that of the predicate) is the being
Ego; then the absolutely valid assertion that both
are one signifies: the Ego is, because it
has posited itself.
This is, indeed, the case according to the
logical form of the proposition. In A=A the first A
is that which is posited in the Ego, (either
absolutely, like the Ego itself, or conditionally,
like any non-Ego) and in this positing of A the Ego
is absolutely subject; and hence the first A is
also called the subject. But the second A
designates that which the Ego, in now making itself
the object of its own reflection discovers thus as
posited in itself, (since it has just before itself
posited the A in itself). The Ego, in asserting
that proposition A=A, predicates in truth not
something of A, but of itself, namely, that it has
found an A posited in itself; and hence the second
A is called predicate.
The Ego in the former and the Ego in the latter
significance are to be absolutely Equal. Hence, the
above proposition may be turned around, and then it
reads: The Ego posits itself simply because
it is. It posits itself through its mere being, and
is through its mere being posited.
This, then, will explain clearly in what
significance we here use the word Ego (I), and will
lead us to a definite explanation of the Ego as
absolute subject. The Ego as absolute subject is
that, the being, essence, whereof consists
merely in positing itself as being. As soon as
it posits itself, it is; and as soon as it is, it
posits itself; and hence the Ego is for the Ego
absolute and necessary. Whatsoever is not for
itself is not an Ego.
The question has been asked. What was I
before I became self-conscious? The answer is,
I was not at all, for I was not I. The Ego
is only, in so far as it is conscious of itself.
The possibility of that question is grounded upon
mixing up of the Ego as subject, and the Ego
as object of the reflection of the absolute
subject; and is in itself altogether improper. The
Ego represents itself, and in so far takes itself
up in the form of representation, and now first
becomes a somewhat, that is, an object.
Consciousness receives in this form of
representation a substrate, which is, even
without the real consciousness, and which,
moreover, is thought bodily. Such a condition is
thought, and the question asked. What was
the Ego at that time? that is, what is the
substrate of consciousness? But even in this
thought you unconsciously add in thinking
the absolute subject as looking at that
substrate; and hence you unconsciously add in
thought the very thing whereof you wanted to
abstract, and thus you contradict yourself. The
truth is, you cannot think anything at all without
adding in thought your Ego as self-conscious; you
cannot abstract from your self-consciousness; and
all questions of the above kind are not to be
answered, since maturely considered, they cannot be
asked.
If the Ego is only so far as it posits
itself, then it also is only for the
positing, and posits only for the being Ego. The
Ego is for the Ego; but if it posits itself
absolutely, as it is, then it posits itself
necessarily, and is necessary for the Ego. I am
only for me; but for me I am necessarily. (By
saying for me, I already posit my being.) To
posit itself and to be is, applied to
the Ego, the same. Hence, the proposition I am
because I have posited myself, can also be
expressed; I am absolutely because I am.
Again, the Ego as positing itself and the Ego as
being are one and the same. The Ego is as
what it posits itself and posits itself as
what it is. Hence, I am absolutely what I
am.
The immediate expression of the thus developed
deed-act may be given in the following formula:
I am absolutely because I am, and I am
absolutely what I am for myself.
If this narration of the original deed-act is to
be placed at the head of a science of knowledge as
its highest fundamental principle, it may perhaps
be best expressed thus:
The Ego posits originally its own
being.
(In other words, the Ego is necessarily identity
of subject and object; is itself subject-object;
and it is this without further meditation.)
We started from the proposition A=A, not as if
the proposition, I am, could be proven by it, but
because we had to start from some one certain
proposition given in empirical consciousness. And
our development, also, has shown that A=A does not
contain the ground of "I am," but, on the contrary,
that the latter proposition is the ground of the
former.
By abstracting from the content of the
proposition I am, and looking merely to its form,
namely, the form of drawing a conclusion from the
being posited of something to its being, as we must
abstract for the sake of logic, we thus obtain as
fundamental principle of logic the
proposition A=A, which can only be proven and
determined through the science of knowledge.
Proven: for A is A because the Ego which has
posited A is the same as the Ego in which A is
posited. Determined: for whatever is, is
only in so far as it is posited in the Ego, and
there is nothing outside of the Ego. No possible A
(no thing) can be any thing else but an A
posited in the Ego.
By abstracting, moreover, from all asserting as
a determined acting, and looking merely to the
general manner of acting, of the human mind,
which is given through that form, we obtain the
category of reality. Every thing to which
the proposition A=A is applicable has reality,
in so far as that proposition is applicable to
it. That which is posited through the mere
positing of any thing (in the Ego ) is its reality,
its essence.
Excerpted from Science of
Knowledge, by Johann Gottlieb Fichte
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The
Science of
Knowledge,
by
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
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