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On the
Nature of Spirit
by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel
The nature of spirit may be understood by a
glance at its direct opposite -- Matter. As
the essence of matter is gravity, so, on the other
hand, we may affirm that the substance, the
essence, of spirit is freedom. All will readily
assent to the doctrine that spirit, among other
properties, is also endowed with freedom; but
philosophy teaches that all the qualities of spirit
exist only through freedom; that all are but means
for attaining freedom; that all seek and produce
this and this alone. It is a result of speculative
philosophy, that freedom is the sole truth of
spirit. Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its
tendency towards a central point. It is essentially
composite; consisting of parts that exclude
each other. It seeks its unity; and therefore
exhibits itself as self-destructive, as verging
towards its opposite [an indivisible
point]. If it could attain this, it would be
matter no longer, it would have perished. It
strives after the realization of its idea; for in
unit it exists ideally. Spirit, on the
contrary, may be defined as that which has its
center in itself. It has not a unity outside
itself, but has already found it; it exists
in and with itself. Matter has its
essence out of itself; spirit is self-contained
existence. Now this is freedom, exactly. For if
I am dependent, my being is referred to something
else which I am not; I cannot exist independently
of anything external. I am free, on the contrary,
when my existence depends upon myself. This
self-contained existence of spirit is none other
than self-consciousness -- consciousness of one's
own being. Two things must be distinguished in
consciousness; first, the fact that 1 know;
secondly what I know. In
self-consciousness these are merged in one;
for spirit knows itself. It involves an
appreciation of its own nature, as also an energy
enabling it to realize itself; to make itself
actually that which it is
potentially. According to this abstract
definition it may be said of universal history,
that it is the exhibition of spirit in the process
of working out the knowledge of that which it is
potentially. . . .
This vast congeries of volitions, interests, and
activities, constitutes the instruments and means
of the world-spirit for attaining its object;
bringing it to consciousness, and realizing it. And
this aim is none other than finding itself --
coming to itself -- and contemplating itself in
concrete actuality. But that those manifestations
of vitality on the part of individuals and peoples,
in which they seek and satisfy their own purposes,
are, at the same time, the means and instruments of
a higher and broader purpose of which they know
nothing, -- which they realize unconsciously, --
might be made a matter of question; rather has been
questioned, and in every variety of form negatived,
decried, and contemned as mere dreaming and
"Philosophy." But on this point I announced my view
at the very outset, and asserted our hypothesis, --
which, however, will appear in the sequel, in the
form of a legitimate inference, and our belief that
reason governs the world, and has consequently
governed its history. In relation to this
independently universal and substantial existence
-- all else is subordinate, subservient to it, and
the means for its development. The union of
universal abstract existence generally with the
individual, the subjective, that this alone is
truth, belongs to the department of speculation,
and is treated in this general form in logic. But
in the process of the world's history itself -- as
still incomplete, -- the abstract final aim of
history is not yet made the distinct object of
desire and interest. While these limited sentiments
are still unconscious of the purpose they are
fulfilling, the universal principle is implicit in
them and is realizing itself through them. The
question also assumes the form of the union of
freedom and necessity; the latent
abstract process of spirit being regarded as
necessity, while that which exhibits itself
in the conscious will of men, as their interest,
belongs to the domain of freedom. As the
metaphysical connection (i.e. the connection in the
idea) of these forms of thought, belongs to logic,
it would be out of place to analyze it here. The
chief and cardinal points only shall be
mentioned.
Philosophy shows that the idea advances to an
infinite antithesis; that, viz. between the idea in
its free, universal form -- in which it exists for
itself -- and the contrasted form of abstract
introversion, reflection on itself, which is formal
existence-for-self, personality, formal freedom,
such as belongs to spirit only. The universal idea
exists thus as the substantial essence of free
volition on the other side. This reflection of the
mind on itself is individual self-consciousness --
the polar opposite of the idea in its general form,
and therefore existing in absolute limitation. This
polar opposite is consequently limitation,
particularization for the universal absolute thing;
it is the side of its definite existence;
the sphere of its formal reality, the sphere of the
reverence paid to God. To comprehend the absolute
connection of this antithesis, is the profound task
of metaphysics. This limitation originates all
forms of particularity of whatever kind. The formal
volition (of which we have spoken) wills itself;
desires to make its own personality valid in all
that it purposes and does; even the pious
individual wishes to be saved and happy. This pole
of the antithesis, existing for itself, is -- in
contrast with the absolute universal being -- a
special separate existence, taking cognizance of
specialty only, and willing that alone. In short it
plays its part in the region of mere phenomena.
This is the sphere of particular purposes, in
effecting which individuals exert themselves on
behalf of their individuality -- give it full play
and objective realization. This is also the sphere
of happiness and its opposite. He is happy who
finds his condition suited to his special
character, will, and fancy, and so enjoys himself
in that condition.
The history of the world is not the theater of
happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in
it, for they are periods of harmony, -- periods
when the antithesis is in abeyance. Reflection on
self, -- the freedom above described -- is
abstractly defined as the formal element of the
activity of the absolute idea. The realizing
activity of which we have spoken is the
middle term of syllogism, one of whose extremes is
the universal essence, the idea, which
reposes in the penetralia of spirit; and the other,
the complex of external things, -- objective
matter. That activity is the medium by which the
universal latent principle is translated into the
domain of objectivity.
***
What is the material in which the ideal of
reason is wrought out? The primary answer would be,
-- personality itself -- human desires --
subjectivity, generally. In human knowledge and
volition, as its material element, reason attains
positive existence. We have considered subjective
volition where it has an object which is the truth
and essence of a reality, viz. where it constitutes
a great world-historical passion. As a subjective
will, occupied with limited passions, it is
dependent, and can gratify its desires only within
the limits of this dependence. But the subjective
will has also a substantial life -- a reality, --
in which it moves in the region of essential
being, and has the essential itself as the object
of its existence. This essential being is the union
of the subjective with the rational
will: it is the moral whole, the state,
which is that form of reality in which the
individual has enjoys his freedom; but on the
condition of his recognizing, believing in and
willing that which is common to the whole. And this
must not be understood as if the subjective will of
the social unit attained its gratification and
enjoyment through that common will; as if this were
a means provided for its benefit; as if the
individual, in his relations to other individuals,
thus limited his freedom, in order that this
universal limitation -- the mutual constraint of
all -- might secure a small space of liberty for
each. Rather, we affirm, are law, morality,
government, and they alone, the positive reality
and completion of freedom. Freedom of a low and
limited order, is mere caprice; which finds its
exercise in the sphere of particular and limited
desires.
Subjective volition -- passion -- is that which
sets men in activity, that which effects
"practical" realization. The idea is the inner
spring of action; the state is the actually
existing, realized moral life. For it is the unity
of the universal, essential will, with that of the
individual; and this is "morality." The individual
living in this unity has a moral life; possesses a
value that consists in this substantiality alone.
Sophocles in his Antigone says, "The divine
commands are not of yesterday, nor of today; no,
they have an infinite existence, and no one could
say whence" they came." The laws of morality are
not accidental, but are the essentially rational.
It is the very object of the state, that what is
essential in the practical activity of men, and in
their dispositions, should be duly recognized; that
it should have a manifest existence, and maintain
its position. It is the absolute interest of reason
that this moral whole should exist; and herein lies
the justification and merit of heroes who have
founded states, -- however rude these may have
been. In the history of the world, only those
peoples can come under our notice which form a
state. For it must be understood that this latter
is the realization of freedom, i.e. of the absolute
final aim, and that it exists for its own sake. It
must further be understood that all the worth which
the human being possesses -- all spiritual reality,
he possesses only through the state. For his
spiritual reality consists in this, that his own
essence -- reason -- is objectively present to him,
that it possesses objective immediate existence for
him. Thus only is he fully conscious; thus only is
he a partaker of morality -- of a just and moral
social and political life. For truth is the unity
of the universal and subjective will; and the
universal is to be found in the state, in its laws,
its universal and rational arrangements. The state
is the divine idea as it exists on earth. We have
in it therefore, the object of history in a more
definite shape than before; that in which freedom
obtains objectivity, and lives in the enjoyment of
this objectivity. For law is the objectivity of
spirit; volition in its true form. Only that will
which obeys law is free; for it obeys itself -- it
is independent and so free. When the state or our
country constitutes a community of existence; when
the subjective will of man submits to laws, -- the
contradiction between liberty and necessity
vanishes. The rational has necessary existence, as
being the reality and substance of things, and we
are free in recognizing it as law, and following it
as the substance of our own being. The objective
and the subjective will are then reconciled, and
present one identical homogeneous whole. For the
morality of the state is not of that ethical
reflective kind, in which one's conviction bears
sway; this latter is rather the peculiarity of the
modern time, while the true antique morality is
based on the principle of abiding by ones duty (to
the State at large). An Athenian citizen did what
was required of him, as it were from instinct: but
if I reflect on the object of my activity, I must
have the consciousness that my will has been called
into exercise. But morality is duly -- substantial
right -- a "second nature" as it has been justly
called; for the first nature of man is his
primary merely animal existence.
***
Summing up what has been said of the state, we
find that we have been led to call its vital
principle, as actuating the individuals who compose
it, -- morality. The state, its laws, its
arrangements, constitute the rights of its members;
its natural features, its mountains, air, and
waters are their country, their fatherland, their
outward material property the history of this
state, their deeds; what their ancestors
have produced belongs to them and lives in their
memory. All is their possession, just as they are
possessed by it; for it constitutes their
existence, their being.
Their imagination is occupied with the ideas
thus presented, while the adoption of these laws,
and of a fatherland so conditioned is the
expression of their will. It is this matured
totality which thus constitutes one being,
the spirit of one people. To it the
individual members belong; each unit is the son of
his nation, and at the same time -- in so far as
the state to which he belongs is undergoing
development -- the son of his age. None remains
behind it, still less advances beyond it. This
spiritual being (the spirit of his time) is his; he
is a representative of it; it is that in which he
originated, and in which he lives. Among the
Athenians the word Athens had a double import;
suggesting primarily, a complex of political
institutions, but no less, in the second place,
that goddess who represented the spirit of the
people and its unity.
This spirit of a people is a determinate
and particular spirit, and is, as just stated,
further modified by the degree of its historical
development. This spirit, then, constitutes the
basis and substance of those other forms of a
nation's consciousness, which have been noticed.
For spirit in its self-consciousness must become an
object of contemplation to itself, and objectivity
involves, in the first instance, the rise of
differences which make up a total of distinct
spheres of objective spirit, in the same way as the
soul exists only as the complex of its faculties,
which in their form of concentration in a simple
unity produce that soul. It is thus one
individuality which, presented in its essence
as God, is honored and enjoyed in religion;
which is exhibited as an object of sensuous
contemplation in art; and is apprehended as
an intellectual conception in philosophy. In
virtue of the original identity of their essence,
purport, and object, these various forms are
inseparably united with the spirit of the state.
Only in connection with this particular religion,
can this particular political constitution exist;
just as in such or such a state, such or such a
philosophy or order of art.
The remark next in order is, that each
particular national genius is to be treated as only
one individual in the process of universal history.
For that history is the exhibition of the divine,
absolute development of spirit in its highest
forms, -- that gradation by which it attains its
truth and consciousness of itself. The forms which
these grades of progress assume are the
characteristic "national spirits" of history, the
peculiar tenor of their moral life, of their
Government, their art, religion, and science. To
realize these grades is the boundless impulse of
the world-spirit -- the goal of its irresistible
urging; for this division into organic members, and
the full development of each, is its idea.
Universal history is exclusively occupied with
showing how spirit comes to a recognition and
adoption of the truth: the dawn of knowledge
appears; it begins to discover salient principles,
and at last it arrives at full consciousness.
Having, therefore, learned the abstract
characteristics of the nature of spirit, the means
which it uses to realize its idea, and the shape
assumed by it in its complete realization in
phenomenal existence, -- namely, the state, nothing
further remains for this introductory section to
contemplate, but -- the course of the world's
history.
Excerpted from Lectures on
the Philosophy of History, by Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel
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Lectures
on the Philosophy
of
World History,
by
Georg W.F. Hegel
The
Philosophy of
History,
by
Georg W.F. Hegel
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