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(Note: This essay has been
reformatted and edited for easy reading on this
website. It is actually one long paragraph in the
original.)
Vegetarianism
by Porphyry
He who says that the man who extends the just as
far as to brutes, corrupts the just, is ignorant
that he does not himself preserve justice, but
increases pleasure, which is hostile to justice. By
admitting, therefore, that pleasure is the end
[of our actions], justice is evidently
destroyed. For to whom is it not manifest that
justice is increased through abstinence? For he who
abstains from every thing animated, though he may
abstain from such animals as do not contribute to
the benefit of society, will be much more careful
not to injure those of his own species. For he who
loves the genus, will not hate any species of
animals; and by how much the greater his love of
the genus is, by so much the more will he preserve
justice towards a part of the genus, and that to
which he is allied.
He, therefore, who admits that he is allied to
all animals, will not injure any animal. But he who
confines justice to man alone, is prepared, like
one enclosed in a narrow space, to hurl from him
the prohibition of injustice. So that the
Pythagorean is more pleasing than the Socratic
banquet. For Socrates said that hunger is the sauce
of food; but Pythagoras said that to injure no one,
and to be exhilarated with justice, is the sweetest
sauce; as the avoidance of animal food, will also
be the avoidance of unjust conduct with respect to
food. For God has not so constituted things that we
cannot preserve ourselves without injuring others;
since, if this were the case, he would have
connected us with a nature which is the principle
of injustice.
Do not they, however, appear to be ignorant of
the peculiarity of justice, who think that it was
introduced from the alliance of men to each other?
For this will be nothing more than a certain
philanthropy; but justice consists in abstaining
from injuring any thing which is not noxious. And
our conception of the just man must be formed
according to the latter, and not according to the
former mode. Hence, therefore, since justice
consists in not injuring any thing, it must be
extended as far as to every animated nature.
On this account, also, the essence of justice
consists in the rational ruling over the
irrational, and in the irrational being obedient to
the rational part. For when reason governs, and the
irrational part is obedient to its mandates, it
follows, by the greatest necessity, that man will
be innoxious towards every thing. For the passions
being restrained, and desire and anger wasting
away, but reason possessing its proper empire, a
similitude to a more excellent nature [and to
deity] immediately follows. But the more
excellent nature in the universe is entirely
innoxious, and, through possessing a power which
preserves and benefits all things, is itself not in
want of any thing.
We, however, through justice [when we
exercise it], are innoxious towards all things,
but, through being connected with mortality, are
indigent of things of a necessary nature. But the
assumption of what is necessary does not injure
even plants, when we take what they cast off; nor
fruits, when we use such of them as are dead; nor
sheep, when through shearing we rather benefit than
injure them, and by partaking of their milk, we in
return afford them every proper attention. Hence,
the just man appears to be one who deprives himself
of things pertaining to the body; yet he does not
[in reality] injure himself. For, by this
management of his body, and continence, he
increases his inward good, i.e., his similitude to
God.
Excerpted from Selected Works
of Porphyry (1823).
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