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Will and
Knowledge
by Etienne Gilson
The only way to ascertain what the free will can
do is to define what it is. Knowing its nature, you
will find in that knowledge a safe rule to define
the power of the will as well as its limitations.
If, on the contrary, you start on the assumption
that it is safer to keep a little below the line,
where are you going to stop? Why, indeed, should
you stop at all? Since it is pious to lessen the
efficacy of free will, it is more pious to lessen
it a little more, and to make it utterly powerless
should be the highest mark of piety. In fact, there
will be mediaeval theologians who come very close
to that conclusion, and even reach it a long time
before the age of Luther and Calvin. Nothing, of
course, would have been more repellent to St.
Bonaventura than such a doctrine; the only question
here is: was St. Bonaventura protected against it?
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature
should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how
could we find in piety a principle of
self-restriction? In theology, as in any other
science, the main question is not to be pious, but
to be right. For there is nothing pious in being
wrong about God!
If piety is not theology, still less is it
philosophy. Yet it cannot be denied that, as a
philosopher, St. Bonaventura sometimes allowed
himself to be carried away by his religious
feelings. In dealing with the nature of causality,
for instance, two different courses were open to
him. First, he could favor the view that where
there is efficient causality, something new, which
we call effect, is brought into existence by the
efficacy of its cause; in this case, every effect
can be rightly considered as a positive addition to
the already existing order of reality. Or St.
Bonaventura could maintain, with St. Augustine,
that God has created all things present and future
at the very instant of creation. From this second
point of view, any particular being, taken at any
time of world history, should be considered, so to
speak, as the seed of all those other beings, or
events, that are to flow from it according to the
laws of divine providence. It is typical of St.
Bonaventura's theologism that he always clung to
this second interpretation of causality. He never
could bring himself to think that efficient
causality is attended by the springing up of new
existences. To him, such a view practically
amounted to crediting creatures with a creative
power that belongs only to God. An effect, says
Bonaventura, is to its cause as the rose is to the
rosebud. It is permissible to appreciate the poetic
quality of his comparison and the religious purity
of his intention, without overlooking its
philosophical implications.
Excerpted from The Unity of
Philosophical Experience, by Etienne
Gilson
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The
Unity of Philosophical
Experience,
by
Etienne Gilson
The
Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas,
by
Etienne Gilson
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