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The
Philosophy of Existentialism
Background Essay
General
Observations About Existentialism
FRENCH
EXISTENTIALISM
The rise of French Existentialism is independent
of that of German Existentialism, just as the
content of the one is independent of the content of
the other. German thinkers except for Jaspers
remain immersed in an immanentist conception,
whereas most French thinkers rise to the
transcendence of God, according to the traditional
spiritualism of their country. Representative of
French Existentialism are Gabriel Marcel, Rene
Lesenne, Louis Lavelle, and Jean-Paul Sartre.
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Gabriel
Marcel
(1889-1973)
Marcel, a dramatist and philosopher, a convert
from Hegelianism to Catholicism, is the most
representative of the French Existentialists. He
expressed his thought in the Journal
metaphysique, Etre et avoir, and Du
refus a l'invocation. Etre et avoir has
been translated into English under the title
Being and Having. None of these works,
however, are systematic treatises. The work of
putting the writings of Marcel into a logical whole
was achieved by one of his friends. Marcel
introduced this compilation to the public with the
words: "This is the book I should have written!"
The philosophical thought of Marcel had originally
been expressed in the form of scattered statements,
of deep flashes of insight into the problems of
human life, which he had noted in his Journal
metaphysique as early as 1925, even before the
publication of the works of Heidegger.
According to Marcel, philosophy is not
research on being but an attempt to find
being. By this distinction he means that the
object of philosophy is not a thing separate from
us, one about which we ask questions for the
purpose of reaching some solution. The object of
philosophical research is the inquiring subject
himself, not only because he is a being but because
he is the first being who is brought into his own
immediate experience. Hence philosophy necessarily
must be existentialist, and its starting point must
be this immediate fact: actual existence in the
world.
This distinction between research on being and
an attempt to find being is followed by another
subtle distinction between "problem" and "mystery."
Marcel designates as problems all the
questions which are concerned with the objects
conceived of as distinct from us. Concerning these,
we may ask questions, and we may deduce a
"solution." On the contrary, he calls "mysteries"
all those questions which are concerned with our
own existence. The answer to such questions can be
obtained only through mystical "recollection."
Besides these two distinctions, Marcel makes
another between having and being. He observes that
having implies a dualism composed of a possessing
subject and a possessed object; having is
concerned with objective exteriority. Being
on the contrary, does not admit of any dualism, for
the object is identical with the subject. Thus I do
not have my body; I am my body.
Having made these distinctions, Marcel begins
his philosophical research with the existent, and
starts from the level of knowledge. First of all,
he observes that perception is not a simple
representation of an object to the sentient
subject. Sensation essentially consists in the act
of perceiving, and this act is "mine." To perceive
an object means that the subject becomes
mysteriously that object. Thus by means of
perception I am deepening in a new and mysterious
way my participation in the universe. Perception is
like a creation of the universe in me.
The first and most intimate participation is
that effected with my body. In virtue of the
distinction between "problem" and "mystery," the
union of the soul with the body is not open to
investigation; for Marcel such a union is a
mystery. I am my body, which means that I am
"incarnated" in my body, not in the sense that my
existence is absorbed by my body, but in the sense
that I could not be existent without this
mysterious "other" which is my body.
Through my body I perceive surrounding objects.
They represent a transcendent thing for me; but
through the act of perception I am open to them and
they are open to me. Thus the act of perception is
an act of love. Through it I transcend myself; I am
in mysterious participation with objects. Through
the act of perception objects become immanent in
me. Now, the objects are no longer a third thing;
they become the "thou" with whom I talk.
From the "thou" of the finite things I ascend to
God, the absolute Thou. Thus, I feel God as present
to me and I invoke Him. The existence of God is an
object of faith and not of reason; and faith is
possible only when charity overcomes all
impediments and all obstacles. Man thus becomes
available to all, and all become available to
man.
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Jean-Paul
Sartre
(1905-1980)
Theological and Moral Nihilism
While for the philosopher Heidegger the
existent is reduced to a being tending to
death, for Jean-Paul Sartre (picture),
the existent is identified with the series of
phenomena which tells us of its existence. In
other words, to be an existent means to be a series
of appearances. Ordinarily, appearance tells us of
a dualism, i.e., the appearance and what is hidden
in that appearance. Such a dualism is denied by
Sartre and he maintains instead that appearance
is the entire and only reality.
As a result God, who cannot be phenomenal, does
not exist; and the existent is only one unit
in the complete series of phenomena, and is
"without support and help." The drama of such a
negative condition is manifested in moments
of "nausea and disgust," similar to the anguish of
Kierkegaard except that the discomfort of the
Danish philosopher resulted in a quest for God,
while in Sartre it is the demonstration of the
"nothingness" with which the existent is
infected.
However, the existent is actuated by "the
other," in the sense that he finds in himself the
representation of the world. Thus the existent is
founded on an opposition: he is both the subject of
consciousness and the representation of the world.
Sartre calls the terms of this opposition of the
"pour-soi" or "for-self" (the existent as subject
of consciousness) and the "en-soi" or "in-self"
(the world, i.e., the totality of phenomena). Each
of these two terms is established because of its
negative relation to the other; that is, the
"for-self" is not the "in-self" and vice versa.
The opposition between the for-self and the
in-self is insuperable. Indeed, if the for-self
were synthesized or metamorphosed into the in-self,
it would become God; but we know that this idea is
contradictory. Thus the existent is nothing other
than a "useless passion," a "project" with the
assignment of putting itself into execution. Since,
according to Sartre, God does not exist and man is
without "support and help," the existent must
construct his existence freely: "Man is
damned to be free." In regard to the free execution
of the project of existence, Sartre repeats the
maxim of Ivan Karamazov of Dostoevski's famed
novel: "If God does not exist, all is permitted";
hence freedom results in arbitrary acts in the
carrying out of the project of existence.
The atheism and amoralism of Sartre may be
considered as the ultimate corruption of
Existentialism, and of philosophy in general.
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Positive contributions of
Existentialism to the Perennial
Philosophy
It is really too early to tell what
contributions Existentialism will make to the
Perennial Philosophy. Heidegger, Jaspers, and
Marcel have certainly raised some concrete issues
which must be addressed by commonsense
philosophical realism. But Sartre makes no positive
contributions whatsoever. There are some
traditional philosophical realists who are making
an attempt to bring about a synthesis of some of
the main points raised by the theistic
Existentialists, but whether or not they are
successful will be seen in the future.
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